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Article
Dangers in Prescription Drugs:
Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate
DAVID G. OWEN
The healthcare debate raging in this nation largely ignores the role of
private law in healthcare reform. One aspect of private law occasionally
included in the discussion is how medical malpractice litigation may raise
healthcare costs, by increasing the cost of liability insurance for medical
providers and encouraging them to practice “defensive medicine.” Yet,
another aspect of private law affecting health care in America remains
outside the current debate—the responsibility of makers and sellers of
prescription drugs for harm caused by the dangers such drugs contain.
Closing this gap in the healthcare debate, this Article proposes that the
law ban design defect litigation against manufacturers of pharmaceuticals,
and, further, that it abolish the “learned intermediary doctrine,” thereby
imposing full-bodied duties on both manufacturers and pharmacists to
warn consumers. These changes should promote the central goals of
healthcare reform—maximizing consumer choice, increasing quality, and
reducing costs of health care in America. While these proposals are bold,
the current healthcare crisis demands bold solutions. Together, these
reforms should motivate drug companies, pharmacists, and patients to
partner together to reduce the harmful effects of unavoidable dangers in
prescription drugs while exploiting the many benefits of pharmaceuticals
for human health.
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Dangers in Prescription Drugs:
Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate
DAVID G. OWEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
How America should reform its healthcare system is one of the most
unsettled and contentious political issues in the nation today. Swirling
within the debate are questions of how to cover millions of uninsured; how
to maximize patient choice of physicians and treatments; how to improve
the quality of care; how broadly to restructure the health delivery system;
and how to limit the costs of, and fund, whatever newly constructed
healthcare system emerges from the present debate. No matter how a
person may view the myriad issues in this great American dialogue, one
which surely will continue for years to come, observers generally agree
that central objectives of any plan should include maximizing consumer
choice and healthcare quality, and minimizing costs.1
When commentators critique the present system, and when they
prescribe cures, they understandably focus most closely on healthcare
providers—physicians, nurses, hospitals, and other persons and institutions
who provide services to the sick, injured, and infirm2—and on those who
fund the system—employers, insurers, and government.3 While the
present debate sometimes also focuses on the citizenry—patients, who are
the consumers of healthcare products—conspicuously absent from such
discussions is a consideration of the ability and responsibility of patients to
participate in decisions concerning their own health care in order to protect
themselves. Instead, patients too often are viewed as (and all too willing to
play the role of) passive recipients of whatever health care the system may
provide. Also missing from the debate is the role of those who make and
sell healthcare products—manufacturers and pharmacists—and how their
*
Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Thanks for research
and editorial assistance to Karen Miller, William Mills, and Douglas Rushton.
1
See Tom Daschle, Climbing the Hill on Health Care, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A17 (“The
goal of meaningful health reform should be to expand coverage, reduce projected costs, improve
health-system quality, and enhance health-care options for all Americans.”); see also Barack Obama,
Op-Ed., Why We Need Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at WK9; Ruth Mantell,
Meaningful Health-Care Reform Getting Closer: Outline of Changes Likely To Be Enacted Begins To
Take Shape, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/health-care-reformconsensus-builds-around; Uwe E. Reinhardt, Lost in the Shuffle: The Overarching Goals of Health
Reform, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX, Aug. 7, 2009, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/lost-inthe-shuffle-the-overarching-goals-of-health-reform.
2
See Reinhardt, supra note 1.
3
See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Health Care Realities, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A23.
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behavior may exacerbate healthcare problems, how altering their behavior
may improve healthcare choice and quality, and how these alterations may
affect healthcare costs.
These gaps in the healthcare debate are part of a broader failure of the
present national discussion to focus meaningfully on the role of private law
in healthcare reform. One aspect of private law, which only recently has
begun to be seriously considered an organic part of healthcare reform, is
the role of medical malpractice litigation in raising the costs of health care
as a whole.4 The threat of expensive malpractice litigation, it is argued,
increases costs by making liability insurance for medical providers more
expensive and by encouraging providers to practice “defensive medicine,”
such as ordering unnecessary tests and treatments to address even the
tiniest doubts and aspects of a patient’s condition.5 Tort reform issues of
this type are important, but although they are beginning to receive some
attention, that attention so far has been insufficient. Yet, there is another
aspect of private law significantly affecting health care in America that has
managed to remain almost entirely under the radar in the current debate—
the responsibility of makers and sellers of prescription drugs for harm
caused by dangers in such drugs. This is the aspect of private law that is
the subject of this Article.
The Article begins to fill a gap in the present healthcare debate on the
role of private law in addressing the problem of dangers in prescription
drugs. Part II explores broadly how the American regulatory and medical
systems work together to promote public health, and what role that leaves
for private law. Part III then examines how products liability law has
evolved with respect to responsibility for harm caused by the design of
prescription drugs, and Part IV considers the evolving law shielding
manufacturers and pharmacists from a duty to provide warnings directly to
drug patients. Part V proposes that private law be reformed to ban design
defect litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers while expanding the
duties of both manufacturers and pharmacists to warn consumers directly
of drug dangers. The Article concludes that such reforms should increase
healthcare choice and quality, while decreasing healthcare costs.

4

See Scott Horsley, Could Lawsuit Curbs Pave Way for Health Care Deal?, NPR, Sept. 2, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?StoryId=112454986; Barack Obama, President Obama’s
Health Care Speech to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/
politics/10obama.text.html?_r=1&ref=politics; Dionne Searcey & Jacob Goldstein, For Health Care,
Tangible & Unseen Costs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A13.
5
See Kimberley A. Strassel, The President’s Tort Two-Step, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, at A17
(“Experts on left and right agree that defensive medicine—ordering tests and procedures solely to
protect against Joe Lawyer—adds enormously to health costs.”); see also Searcey & Goldstein, supra
note 4 (“This is defensive medicine—a careful, fretful approach to treating patients, in which doctors
authorize tests in part to reduce the risk that they will be sued.”).
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II. PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, PRIVATE LAW,
AND THE HEALTHCARE PROBLEM
No one should doubt that dangerous pharmaceuticals are a significant
contributor to the current healthcare crisis, contributing extensively to
human suffering and substantially increasing healthcare costs. Each year
offers new examples of injuries and deaths caused by untoward dangers in
prescription drugs. Prominent illustrations from recent years include
Vioxx, a popular arthritis painkiller that more than doubled the risk of
heart attacks and strokes,6 a risk that lingered long after users stopped
taking the drug;7 “Phen-fen,” a diet drug that caused heart damage;8 and
Propulsid, a drug that reduced gastric acid but also threatened patients’
hearts.9 Once information on these side-effects became known to the
public, the manufacturers of each of these drugs stopped selling them and,
eventually, paid millions or billions of dollars to settle claims for resulting
injuries.10 Merck, for example, having withdrawn the profitable Vioxx
drug11 from the market in 2004, settled nearly 50,000 Vioxx cases in late
2007 for $4.85 billion.12 In 2009, Eli Lilly agreed to plead guilty and pay
$1.415 billion in criminal and civil penalties for promoting its
antipsychotic drug, Zyprexa, as suitable for uses not approved by the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”).13 These cases may be among the more
prominent, but they represent just the tip of the iceberg of damage caused
by prescription drugs.
Many have been frustrated in attempting to figure out just how
principles of private law, products liability in particular, should be applied
6
See Parker Waichman Alonso LLP, Yet Another Vioxx Settlement, Aug. 4, 2009,
http://www.yourlawyer.com/articles/read/16836 [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement]; Official Vioxx
Settlement, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com (last visited Sept. 3, 2009); see also Margaret
Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, Preemption, and the
Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347, 349–50 (2008) [hereinafter Gilhooley, Addressing
Risks]; Bextra Doubles Risk of Heart Attack and Stroke, Study Finds, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Nov. 11,
2004, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/vioxx_bextra2.html (stating that Bextra, another Cox-2
inhibitor, possibly shares the same risk as Vioxx).
7
Steven Reinberg, Vioxx’s Heart Risk Lingered Long After Use Ended, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 14, 2008, http://health.usnews.com/articles/health/healthday/2008/10/14/vioxxs-heart-risklingered-long-after-use-ended.html.
8
Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for Drug Regulation, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 569, 578–79 (2006).
9
Id. at 581–82.
10
See id. at 582 (reporting that Johnson & Johnson paid $90 million in 2004 to settle claims that
Propulsid caused hundreds of deaths and many thousands of injuries); see also id. at 579 (reporting
that, in 2004, Wyeth settled the Phen-fen class action for $3.75 billion).
11
Annual sales of Vioxx reportedly were $2.5 billion. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 6.
12
Id.
13
This amount included a $515 million criminal fine, the largest ever imposed on an individual
corporation in the United States. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay
$1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html [hereinafter DOJ Press Release, Jan. 15,
2009].
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to prescription drugs. Whether and how prescription drugs should be
treated differently from other products has consumed more time and effort,
and resulted in the gnashing of more teeth, than about any other
particularized issue in all of American products liability law.14 In addition
to featuring two prominent Restatement provisions—comment k to section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and section 6 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—the drug liability story
wends through two of the most important cases in modern products
liability law history: Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories15 and Brown v.
Superior Court,16 which together rescued American law from the great
strict liability experiment of the 1960s and 1970s and returned principles of
foreseeable risk and negligence as the bedrock of responsibility for
manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs.17
Drug liability law involves a vast range of complex products liability
issues, including the battle for supremacy between consumer-oriented and
manufacturer-oriented liability tests for establishing the defectiveness of a
product’s design; the never-ending struggle between negligence and strict
liability; how design and warning defect notions fit together; the
responsibility of manufacturers for harm from inherent dangers that are
unforeseeable or otherwise unavoidable under the prevailing state of the
art; the scope of a manufacturer’s liability for prenatal harm; limitations on
litigation by a manufacturer’s compliance with federal agency regulations;
the federal preemption doctrine; and, at bottom, whether prescription drugs
in fact are sufficiently distinct from other types of products to be treated

14
For discussion of prescription drug liability, see Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness
and Efficacy Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 1051, 1055–57 (2007) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness]; Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 8, at 573–74; George W. Conk, The
True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-Constrained Market,
49 UCLA L. REV. 737, 738–39 (2002) [hereinafter Conk, True Test]; George W. Conk, Is There a
Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087–89
(2000) [hereinafter Conk, Design Defect]; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The Continuing Search for Proper
Perspective: Whose Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a Prescription Product Design Defect
Analysis?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 234 (1999); Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for
Some but Not Others: The FDA Experience and Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
927, 929–30 (1999); Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 208–10 (1999); James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 151–53 (2001); Lars Noah,
This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839 (2009); Victor E.
Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription for Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135,
136 (2005); Jane Stapleton, Liability for Drugs in the U.S. and EU: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 REV.
LITIG. 991, 992 (2007). For a fuller collection of the literature, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW § 8.10 n.1 (2d ed. 2008).
15
479 A.2d 374, 382–83 (N.J. 1984).
16
751 P.2d 470, 482–83 (Cal. 1988).
17
On the role of these two cases in the history of tort law, see David G. Owen, Bending Nature,
Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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differently by the law.
As with most other types of products, manufacturers of prescription
pharmaceuticals presently are subject to liability on four separate grounds:
for misrepresenting a drug’s dangers and for selling drugs with defects in
manufacture, design, or warnings. There is little debate about the first two
grounds—all agree that manufacturers should bear the consequences of
selling drugs that are said to be safe when the manufacturer knows they are
not, and for selling drugs that are dangerously contaminated. In private
law, the raging debates on drug products liability law concern
responsibility for defects in a drug’s formulation (“design”) and whether
manufacturers and pharmacists should have a duty—like manufacturers
and retailers of most other types of products—to warn consumers directly
of whatever substantial, hidden dangers pharmaceuticals may contain. As
will be explored below, the issue of design defectiveness is a troublesome
but largely phantom issue in modern drug litigation, where,
notwithstanding the availability of drug design liability, “the liability game
is with the warnings candle, not with design.”19 Yet American law needs
to stomp out drug design litigation altogether, and to spread the light of the
warnings candle, since present legal doctrine misguidedly shields both
manufacturers and pharmacists from full responsibility to warn consumers
of the many hazards that lurk within prescription pharmaceuticals.
A. The Problem of Dangerous Drugs
Prescription drugs are paradoxical: as one of the greatest triumphs of
the twentieth century, their powerful chemicals and biologics save many
millions of humans from suffering and death; yet, these same chemicals
also cause great suffering and death.20 All prescription drugs, that is,
possess substantial costs as well as benefits. This is because most drug
hazards are inherent and unavoidable. Normally, these dangers simply
cannot be removed: the same chemical properties in drugs that can cause
great harm to some are the very properties that are therapeutic to others.21
Put another way, if a drug’s chemical structure were altered to avoid some
adverse health effect, that same change often would also reduce or
eliminate the drug’s health benefits. Thus, a drug’s “design” normally
cannot be changed to improve its safety.

18
These particular topics are all addressed in OWEN, supra note 14. This Article draws in part
from various sections, particularly sections 8.10 and 9.6, of the forthcoming third edition of this
treatise. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (3d ed. forthcoming).
19
Green, supra note 14, at 209.
20
“[Indeed,] all drugs do harm.” Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 8, at 570.
21
“Normally,” because the hazard in some drugs may be reduced or eliminated by changing the
prescribed dosage, the active ingredients in combination drugs, or the inert ingredients used in a drug.
Green, supra note 14, at 210–12. On inherent product hazards, see OWEN, supra note 14, §§ 6.2, 10.3.
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Penicillin may be the classic example of a drug that, while highly
beneficial to most people, can be hazardous, indeed lethal, to others.22 But,
other examples abound. Accutane is a good modern illustration of a drug
that combines great benefits with great risks of harm: it is highly effective
in treating the most severe cases of acne; yet, it is a virulent teratogen that
can cause serious birth defects when given to pregnant women.23 Surely
the most compelling historical example of this phenomenon is thalidomide,
another teratogen, prescribed widely as a sedative and for morning
sickness throughout much of the world (but not the United States) during
the 1950s and 1960s.24 Despite the enormous toll of birth defects this drug
then wreaked around the globe, the FDA approved thalidomide in 1998 for
fighting leprosy.25 These are only three illustrations, and the list of
unavoidably unsafe drugs goes on and on.26
Outside of tort law, the American medico-legal systems address this
conundrum—the bad-comes-with-the-good aspect of prescription drugs—
in two basic ways.27 First, prior to being allowed onto the market,
prescription drugs must undergo rigorous chemical analysis, laboratory
testing, and clinical trials, the results of which are closely scrutinized by
22

See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971).
See Myers v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 170 P.3d 254, 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
24
Thalidomide caused severe limb deformities in children born to women who took the drug
while pregnant. The FDA’s protracted review of the drug barely saved most Americans from this
terrible tragedy. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 313–14 (1992) (characterizing thalidomide as “one of the most potent
human teratogens ever found”); see also Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a
False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153, 2158 n.26 (1997).
25
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved To Treat Leprosy, with Other Uses Seen, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A1.
26
See PROSSER, supra note 22, § 99 (“The whole pharmacopeia is full of drugs which are not
safe, and at present cannot be made safe.”).
27
A third approach that lies outside the tort law system is the no-fault compensation system to
compensate children suffering adverse reactions to vaccinations required by public health statutes. See
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 (2006). Claims are
made in the Court of Claims against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, including recovery
for economic losses, pain and suffering (limited to $250,000), and death (limited to $250,000). Id. §§
300aa-11(c), 300aa-15(c). A claimant may accept or reject the court’s award; if it is rejected, the
claimant may then (and only then) initiate a products liability action against the manufacturer. Id. §
300aa-22(b)(1). The Act, however, bars recovery in such actions for “side effects that were
unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions
and warnings.” Id. § 300aa-22.
For useful descriptions of the structure of the Act, see Okianer C. Dark, Is the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 839–42
(1988); Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and
Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 761–62 (2002); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of
a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 958–60 (1993); Derry
Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 62–64 (1999); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian,
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 389–91 (1987); Whitney S. Waldenberg & Sarah E. Wallace, When Science Is
Silent: Examining Compensation of Vaccine-Related Injuries When Scientific Evidence of Causation Is
Inconclusive, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 305–07 (2007).
23
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the FDA, to assure both the safety and efficacy of all new drugs. Under
the amended Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,28 Congress has
vested more regulatory power in the FDA to regulate drug safety than it
has vested in other agencies to regulate the safety of other products,
reflecting the special role of prescription drugs in preserving life and health
together with the special dangers such drugs pose to life and health. A key
function of the FDA is to help ensure that only drugs that, on balance, are
beneficial to some class of patients ever reach the healthcare market.29
The second relevant feature of America’s medico-legal system is that it
positions experts in diagnosis and drug therapy—doctors and nurse
practitioners—between beneficial yet dangerous prescription drugs, on the
one hand, and the lay public who need drug therapy, on the other. The role
of such healthcare professionals, such “learned intermediaries,” is to
connect individual drugs with individual patients—to choose from among
the panoply of available prescription drugs the one with the highest
benefit-risk ratio for each particular patient’s needs. That is, a doctor’s
role in drug therapy is to ensure that the right prescription medicine, in
view of its particular benefits and risks, is assigned to the right patient, in
view of that patient’s special needs.30
B. The Question for Private Law
The question of interest here is what role, if any, does the medico-legal
system leave for private law—the law of torts and products liability?
Because the system just described breaks down in many ways in practice,
American products liability law has assumed a vital role in compensating

28
21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006); see also id. § 331(a) (prohibiting the sale of “any food, drug,
device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded”); id. § 355(a) (requiring FDA approval prior to
the marketing of any new drug).
29
For discussion of the FDA and drug regulation, see Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness, supra note
14, at 1062–67; Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 8, at 569–71; Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product
Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 624–26 (2007); Richard A.
Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741, 748–49 (2005); Gilhooley, Addressing Risks, supra note 6, at 349–
51; Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The Respective Roles of
Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 163, 167–68 (1998); Marc T. Law, How Do Regulators
Regulate? Enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 1907–38, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 459, 460–61
(2006); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1753, 1753–54 (1996) [hereinafter Merrill, Architecture]; Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for
Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1973) [hereinafter Merrill, Compensation]; Teresa
M. Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance Between the
Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 445–46 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Striking the Right Balance];
Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 1121, 1147–49 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations]; Catherine T.
Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of
Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 594–97 (2005).
30
See infra Part IV.D.1. (examining the “learned intermediary doctrine”).
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persons harmed unnecessarily by defective drugs, and some role in
promoting drug safety by deterring the sale of such unnecessarily
dangerous drugs. The model of a perfect FDA, unfortunately, does not fit
the real world closely. Legislative, budgetary, and political constraints mar
the ideal of a regulatory body that optimally protects the public from
exposure to defective drugs.31 Nor, as most people painfully well know, do
doctors typically match prescription drugs to patients in a manner that
approaches optimality.32 Thus, due to these and other shortcomings in the
medico-legal structure for the production and distribution of prescription
drugs in the United States, products liability law plays a significant role in
compensating, and hopefully helping to protect, consumers of defective
prescription drugs.
Because the answer to the question posed above is that American
products liability law plays an important role when people suffer harm
from prescription drugs, we must inquire into what that role is and what it
should be. The following inquiry reveals that courts, commentators, and
the Torts Restatements mostly agree that the American products liability
system should place its primary emphasis on assuring that doctors and
(indirectly) patients receive adequate warnings about drug dangers, and
instructions on how to avoid them, and that judicial reevaluations of
prescription drug designs should be limited.
How these general
propositions have evolved doctrinally in the Restatements and the courts is
first explored, beginning with a consideration of a drug manufacturer’s
duty of safe design and followed by a consideration of the limited warning
duties of both drug manufacturers and pharmacists. This Article then
inquires into how current principles of responsibility for harm from
prescription drugs might be reformed to better address the fundamental
goals of America’s healthcare system.

31
For discussion of weaknesses present in the FDA model, see George W. Conk, Punctuated
Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG.
799, 860–61 (2007); Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and
Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 941–43 (2007) [hereinafter Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History];
Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2075–77 (2000); Schwartz,
Role of Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 29, at 1154–58. Congress addressed some of the
weaknesses in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, which expanded agency
oversight of drug safety and provided the agency with additional resources. See Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 825, 842 (2007); see also
Morgan Weiland, FDA: President Bush Signs FDA Legislation Expanding Drug Safety, Drug, Device
Fees, PRODUCT LIABILITY DAILY (BNA), Sept. 28, 2007, at D7.
32
Apart from the increasingly limited time doctors devote to treating each patient, doctors
typically receive woefully limited education on pharmaceuticals. See infra note 162 and accompanying
text (noting that doctors typically know less than pharmacists about drugs); see also FRANK M.
MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHICS 188–89 (1994) (discussing the
limited knowledge and inadequate training of physicians in drug therapy); Green, supra note 14, at 229
n.67 (explaining how the “idealized role of the physician is not borne out in practice”).
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III. DESIGN DANGERS IN PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS
Design defectiveness has never been a favored theory of recovery for
drug injuries. While strict liability in tort generally got off the ground in
America in the 1960s, and while design defect claims for most types of
products became prevalent during the 1970s, American courts did not even
begin imposing design defect liability on drug manufacturers until the
1980s and 1990s.33 And even to the present, most courts in the United
States are chary in allowing such claims, properly directing drug litigation
away from design defect claims to warning claims.
A. The Controversial Comment k
An attempt to understand how the notion of a design defect fits
together with prescription drugs in American products liability law ideally
should begin with a study of the chemical properties, manufacturing
techniques, marketing approaches, and therapeutic applications of this
peculiar type of product. Yet, because time and space require that such
deep explorations be left to specialized texts34 and journal articles35 on
drugs, the best place to begin the inquiry here is with comment k, a
controversial comment to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. In a nutshell, comment k provides that manufacturers are not subject
to strict liability in tort for harm caused by certain “unavoidably unsafe”
but useful products, notably prescription drugs, on the basis that their
inherent hazards cannot feasibly be designed away.36 The Reporter for the
33
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. is widely thought to be the first prescription drug case
in which a defective drug design claim figured prominently. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642
F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that a manufacturer of oral contraceptives could be held liable
for design defect inherent in high content of estrogen in a pill). A small number of earlier cases also
involved challenges to drug designs. See Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 444–46
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (ruling that an unstable pertussis vaccine that damaged an infant’s brain was
unmerchantable), aff’d as modified, 411 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1969); Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co.,
257 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D.N.D. 1966) (holding that a defect in manufacturer’s drug caused damage to
brain), aff’d, 411 F.2d 1390, 1402 (8th Cir. 1969).
34
See 5 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 50 (Cary Stewart
Sklaren ed., 2007) (examining drug litigation); see also 1 FRANK C. WOODSIDE, DRUG PRODUCT
LIABILITY ch. 3 (2009) (examining principles of pharmacology).
35
See supra note 14.
36
In fact, this is the theme of three companion comments to section 402A: comments i, j, and k.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i–k (1965); see also OWEN, supra note 14, § 6.2
(examining these three comments in depth). In full, comment k provides:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of
the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same
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Second Restatement who drafted comment k, William Prosser, justified this
exemption in a famous quote:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous
products should make good the harm, distribute it by liability
insurance, and add the cost to the price of the product,
encounters reason for pause, when we consider that two of
the greatest medical boons to the human race, penicillin and
cortisone, both have their dangerous side-effects, and that
drug companies might well have been deterred from
producing and selling them.37
Drugs, in short, are different.38 As a result, most American courts
agree that comment k properly exempts useful prescription drugs that are
unavoidably unsafe from strict products liability,39 assuming always that
is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
37
PROSSER, supra note 22, § 99.
38
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14, at 153 (explaining that drugs are different from other
products and should be treated differently under the Restatement); Daniel P. Richardson, Note, The
Lost Child of Products Liability: New Thoughts About Advertising and the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine, 27 VT. L. REV. 1017, 1049 (2003). Professor Michael Green has catalogued various ways in
which drugs are different: (1) “they cannot be manipulated physically to provide marginally greater
safety”; (2) they are harmful for some people while beneficial for others; (3) their adverse effects
frequently are not discoverable through research and testing, such that these harmful effects are not
revealed until they injure drug consumers; (4) they are subject to especially heavy regulatory oversight,
much of it pre-market, by the FDA; (5) they have high social utility; and (6) learned intermediaries, i.e.,
doctors, stand between drug products and consumers, matching particular drugs to particular people.
Green, supra note 14, at 209–11, 232. To these six claims of difference, a seventh might be added: (7)
they are extremely costly to bring to market—each new brand name prescription drug on average
costing roughly $500 million for research, development, laboratory testing, clinical testing, FDA
submission work, and production.
For information on the costs of getting a single new prescription pharmaceutical to market, see
Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical
Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 231 (2001) (listing an estimated cost of between $250 and
$500 million based on the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economic Staff Reporting);
Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and
Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 973 (2007) (“The FDA approval process takes six to
fifteen years and costs between $100 million and $880 million per drug.”); Justin C. Ward, Note, Bayer
v. Schein Pharmaceuticals—Best Mode Requirement—In Chemical Inventions: When Does “Carrying
Out the Invention” Start? A Proposal for a Comprehensive Best Mode Compliance Test, 3 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 120, 142 n.25 (2003) (estimating a cost of $800 million).
39
See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, § 8.07[3] (citing cases from thirty states and the
District of Columbia applying comment k). A small number of courts have explicitly rejected comment
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they are properly prepared and carry adequate warnings.
In addition to disagreeing about comment k’s very premise—that
prescription drug manufacturers should be protected from the rigors of
strict liability—courts and commentators disagree about a number of other,
important aspects of comment k, including (1) whether its application is
confined to a limited class of drugs properly characterized as “unavoidably
unsafe,” or whether it broadly applies to all prescription drugs; and (2)
whether the exemption it affords from strict liability in tort applies as well
to negligence. On the first question, the New Jersey Supreme Court in
1984 ruled in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories41 that only certain drugs
qualify for comment k’s exemption from design defect liability—those
proven on a case-by-case basis to be highly useful and unavoidably
unsafe.42 The year after Feldman, a California intermediate appellate court
decided Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,43 in which it adopted and
elaborated upon the Feldman approach, prescribing a detailed “mini-trial”
necessary before a judge could qualify a drug for exemption from strict
liability under comment k.44 Soon thereafter, however, the California
Supreme Court rejected the Feldman-Kearl approach in Brown v. Superior
Court, interpreting comment k as embracing all prescription drugs within
its unavoidably-unsafe safe harbor.45 The Brown court reasoned that
forcing drug manufacturers to litigate whether their drugs deserve designdefect exemption in every case would emasculate comment k’s objective of
k. See, e.g., Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 954 (Nev. 1994) (holding that comment k does not
apply because the victim chose to be injected having known the potential consequences); Collins v. Eli
Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984) (holding that comment k is too restrictive); see also Shanks
v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1197–98 (Alaska 1992) (refusing to adopt comment k but agreeing with
its basic policy).
40
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
41
479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
42
Id. at 382–83.
Comment k immunizes from strict liability the manufacturers of some products,
including certain drugs, that are unavoidably unsafe. However, we see no reason to
hold as a matter of law and policy that all prescription drugs that are unsafe are
unavoidably so. Drugs, like any other products, may contain defects that could have
been avoided by better manufacturing or design. Whether a drug is unavoidably
unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis; we perceive no justification [in
policy or under comment k for immunizing prescription drug manufacturers from
their safe manufacturing, warning, and risk-utility design obligations under strict
liability in tort.]
Id. at 383.
43
218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
44
Sitting in this phase of the trial without a jury, the judge would determine:
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer an exceptionally
important benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the thenexisting risk posed by the product both was “substantial” and “unavoidable”; and
(3) whether the interest in availability (again measured as of the time of
distribution) outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability through
strict liability design defect review.
Id. at 464; see also Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840–41 (Neb. 2000).
45
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 (Cal. 1988).
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shielding prescription drug manufacturers ex ante from the risks of design
defect litigation ex post in order to reduce the perils of “overdeterrence,”
such as higher drug prices and fewer new drugs.46 While a few courts have
followed Brown’s general exemption of all prescription drugs from design
defect liability,47 most courts have taken the Feldman-Kearl case-by-case
approach, reluctant to surrender judicial oversight of a drug manufacturer’s
responsibility for safety in design.48
Another aspect of comment k that engenders some debate is whether
comment k, assuming (as almost all courts do) that it exempts
manufacturers of at least some drugs from strict liability in tort, should
exempt them also from liability in negligence for defects in design.49 The
language of comment k, which should not be parsed as if it were a statute,
does not address the question of a drug manufacturer’s liability in
negligence for defects in design. After all, this provision is a comment to
section 402A, which addresses a seller’s strict liability in tort—not
negligence, which is a different topic the Restatement separately addresses
in another section.50 Apart from this quite obvious fact, the debate may be
resolved quite simply: if the design of a drug is not defective for purposes
of strict liability in tort, it cannot be negligent to sell it in that nondefective
condition.51
While this kind of doctrinal, set-theory reasoning normally is sound, it
falters somewhat in the special context of prescription drugs. Comment k
exempts all prescription drugs from strict liability in tort, not because they
all are truly nondefective, but because (1) most drugs are (due to market
competition and oversight by the FDA); and (2) a protective umbrella
46

Id. at 479–80.
For decisions supporting the exemption of all prescription drugs from liability, see Transue v.
Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2003); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982);
Adams v. Wyeth, No. 3452, 2005 WL 1528656, at *3–4 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. June 13, 2005);
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991).
48
For decisions supporting a case-by-case approach, see West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608,
612 (Ark. 1991); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Bryant
v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732
P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987); Glassman v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 606 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924 (Kan. 1990); Bennett v. Madakasira, 821 So. 2d 794,
809 (Miss. 2002); Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 837; Hill v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 4:03CV1526 JCH, 2007 WL
674251, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2007); White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio
1988); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988).
49
Most courts hold that negligence liability in fact applies to the design of drugs. See, e.g.,
Toner, 732 P.2d at 310; Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324–25 (Kan. 1986).
50
The Second Restatement addresses a manufacturer’s negligent design of products in section
395, which makes no reference to liability for the sale of dangerous drugs. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
51
See PROSSER, supra note 22, § 99 (“Where only negligence liability is in question, the answer
as to such products [inherently hazardous drugs] is usually a simple one. The utility and social value of
the thing sold normally outweighs the known, and all the more so the unknown risk, and there is no
negligence in selling it, provided always that proper warning and directions are given.”); see also
OWEN, supra note 14, §§ 2.1, 5.9.
47
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shielding all prescription drugs (including the defective ones) from strict
liability avoids discouraging manufacturers from developing important
new drugs (most of which will be nondefective) and from setting high drug
prices. Thus, some prescription drugs probably are “defective” in design
notwithstanding the comment k exemption, and the manufacturers of some
of those defective drugs may well have been negligent in their
development and sale.
Even if strict liability for design defects is allowed in prescription drug
cases, its usefulness to consumers appears quite limited. Because the
doctor is the “consumer” in such cases under the learned intermediary
rule,52 the consumer expectations test provides no relief to patients
suffering foreseeable drug injuries if the manufacturer adequately warned
doctors of that risk. And if the drug contains foreseeable dangers that
doctors do not expect, failure-to-warn claims protect persons injured by
such drugs. Finally, because almost all American jurisdictions now shield
manufacturers from liability for dangers that are unforeseeable under the
prevailing state of the art,53 patients injured by an unforeseeable drug risk
in most American courts have no claim under any liability test or theory.
Under a risk-utility test (whether based on “negligence,” “strict
liability,” or simply “design defectiveness”),54 a manufacturer is subject to
liability for failing to adopt a particular design feature that would have
prevented the plaintiff’s harm if the safety benefits of the untaken design
feature were greater than its costs.55 But this suggests that a drug can be
re-engineered to eliminate a particular danger without sacrificing its health
benefits, which normally is impossible since the hazards in most drugs, as
mentioned earlier, are inherent and unavoidable.56 This leaves only one
narrow version of risk-benefit analysis available for properly assessing the
defectiveness of a drug’s design: the approach adopted by the Third
Restatement.
B. The Third Restatement
In 1998, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) promulgated a liability
standard for defective drug designs that is unusual, to say the least.
Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (the
“Third Restatement”) provides:
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not
reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are
52

See infra Part IV.D.1.
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 10.4.
Id. §§ 2.2, 5.7, 8.4.
55
See id. §§ 8.4–.5, 8.8.
56
See supra Part II.A.
53
54
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sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients.57
The most important thing to note about this novel liability standard,
which has been judicially applied,58 is that it leaves a very small window
for design defect claims for prescription drugs, a window so tiny that
almost no drug claim could fit through it. Even thalidomide would not be
captured by the Third Restatement test because of its value in treating
leprosy. But thalidomide may prove the virtue of this test, rather than its
frailty, for who reasonably can argue that lepers should be deprived of
beneficial drug therapy because some doctors improperly give the drug to
child-bearing women. In such a case, the defect, it would seem, would lie
in the doctor rather than the drug. While not minimizing the tragedy of a
child born deformed to a woman who was prescribed the drug improperly,
perhaps tort (and possibly criminal) remedies against the prescribing
doctor would be a better way to address the problem, rather than forcing
the manufacturer and lepers to suffer from an untoward misuse of a
pharmaceutical that is highly beneficial to at least one class of patients.
In a world in which the medico-legal scheme described earlier operates
with perfection—where manufacturers carefully conduct, and act
appropriately upon, drug-safety investigations; where a fully-funded, and
politically neutral, FDA keeps drugs with foreseeable excess dangers from
being sold; and where doctors perfectly match individual drugs to
individual patients—the section 6(c) formulation of design defectiveness
for drugs would appear ideal. The problem, of course, is that models of a
perfect FDA and of perfect prescribing doctors are quite inaccurate. But
the solution to imperfections in the medico-legal framework is not to allow
juries to engage in risk-utility comparisons between different drugs used to
treat the same condition.
Assume that three drugs, A, B, and C, each are used to fight lung
infections, and that drug A causes drowsiness in some persons, drug B
causes birth defects when given to some women, and drug C causes acne in
some teenage boys. A doctor presumably would prescribe drug B or
possibly C to an adult male truck driver, drug A or B to a teenage boy, and
drug A or C to a woman capable of bearing children. Assuming that each
57

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1998).
See Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Ariz. 1999) (granting summary
judgment for manufacturer because plaintiff failed to prove that a reasonable healthcare provider would
not have prescribed an Angelchik for any class of patients), aff’d, 15 F. App’x 540 (9th Cir. 2001); see
also Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (providing an
example where the defendant’s expert testified that “risks of obesity for some patients are greater than
the risks of [dietary] medications”).
58
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drug bears proper warnings, surely the law should not allow juries to
impose substantial economic costs on the manufacturer of any of these
drugs because a prescribing doctor matches one drug to the wrong patient.
Nor should these manufacturers have to litigate such cases of misprescription, over and over again in courtrooms around the nation,
assuming further, of course that they fully and properly performed their
investigation and reporting duties to the FDA. Nor should consumers be
deprived of one or two of these drugs because the litigation costs
(including occasional lost verdicts) prove too burdensome for
manufacturers to keep them on the market, particularly when juries begin
to classify one drug of the three as causing the least net harm to all these
patient groups, considered as a whole.59
This latter example reveals the perils of using a global, macro-balance
approach to risk-utility analysis.60 Notwithstanding the frailties of doctors
and the FDA, a drug’s design should not be characterized as defective on
the ground that its total harm to all users exceeds its total benefits to all
users, assuming that the drug provides net benefits to any class of patients,
and assuming further that the drug’s excessive harm results from its
improper use by doctors.61 Applying such a macro-balance test to declare
drug designs defective in such cases would be both “unfair and
inefficient,” in the words of the Third Restatement Reporters, because it
“would require courts to deny classes of patients access to a particular drug
that provides them unique benefits in order to protect other patients from
the risks of misprescription by negligent physicians.”62
Pointing to the weaknesses in the FDA and healthcare delivery
systems, the natural profit motivations of drug manufacturers to skimp on
product research and design,63 a patent system that artificially protects
59

See infra text accompanying note 195.
For a discussion of “macro-balancing” and “micro-balancing,” see generally David G. Owen,
Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: “Micro-Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1661 (1997).
61
This assumes that a manufacturer’s sales representatives do not promote the drug for such
improper use, in which case the manufacturer should be subject to liability. On the prevalence of such
promotion, see Gardiner Harris, Pfizer To Pay $2.3 Billion To Settle Inquiry over Marketing Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at B4; DOJ Press Release, Jan. 15, 2009, supra note 13. On the prevalence
of off-label use by physicians, see Johns, supra note 38, at 968–69; Lars A. Noah, Constraints on the
Off–Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 139–41 (1994). On
the ignorance of many doctors as to whether common drugs’ uses are or are not off-label, see Kevin B.
O’Reilly, Physicians Know FDA-OK’d Uses for Drugs Half the Time, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7, 2009,
at 21.
62
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14, at 152–53. For commentary that agrees that section 6(c)
basically is sound, if in need of some improvement, see Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness, supra note 14, at
1088–94 (suggesting how courts may “modify the radicalism of § 6(c)”); Green, supra note 14, at 209.
63
See Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is
It Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 692 (1997) (“[I]n light of the enormous
amounts of money at stake in the global pharmaceutical industry, manufacturers are inevitably tempted
to market products that are clearly less effective and more dangerous than others.”).
60
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manufacturers from competition, and the industry’s temptation to overpromote its products,64 some courts and commentators reject the Third
Restatement’s narrow definition of design defectiveness for drugs.65 The
argument for rejecting section 6(c) is the belief that drug designs should be
subject to private law challenge on some basis or another—either by means
of a normal risk-utility test (on proof of a safer alternative design) or a
macro-balance test (on proof that a drug caused patients as a whole more
harm than good). Yet, neither approach works well in most drug cases, as
previously discussed. The first simply does not work because most drugs
cannot be redesigned, since their hazards are inherent. As for the second
test, it is true that any product that causes more harm than good is truly bad
(“defective”) from a utilitarian point of view. And, if there were an
effective way to identify such products, their manufacturers might fairly be
required to pay for all the harm they cause, and such products normally
should be banned.66 As discussed above, however, particular classes of
patients (e.g., lepers) deserve therapy from drugs, even if doctors
sometimes do misuse those drugs on other classes of patients. Moreover,
there is a devil residing in the process of distinguishing which drugs, on
balance, have net value from those that produce net harm—and in the
threat of repeated litigation over the ultimate social value of any type of
drug that causes someone harm because it did not suit that patient.
So the Third Restatement’s test for defective drug designs, though very
narrow, and incomplete in failing to identify important exceptions,67 seems
basically correct. By putting most drugs beyond the reach of design defect
litigation (under any liability theory), the Third Restatement properly pours
most litigation concerning hazardous drugs into the defectiveness of their
warnings and instructions,68 to which the discussion now turns.
64

See Harris, supra note 61 (describing “the largest health care fraud settlement and the largest
criminal fine of any kind ever” resulting from Pfizer’s illegal marketing of Bextra and other drugs).
65
See Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 725–28 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Freeman
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 839–40 (Neb. 2000); Conk, True Test, supra note 14, at
738–40; Conk, Design Defect, supra note 14, at 1088–89; Cupp, supra note 14, at 234; Richard L.
Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third)
Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 80 (1994); Jerry J. Phillips, The
Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 130 (1996); Schwartz,
Striking the Right Balance, supra note 29, at 459; Teresa M. Schwartz, Prescription Products and the
Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1378–85 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Prescription Products]; Dustin R. Marlowe, Note, A Dose of Reality for Section 6(c) of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 39 GA. L. REV. 1445, 1446–48 (2005).
66
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 10.3.
67
For discussions of some exceptions to the Third Restatement’s test, see William A. Dreier,
Manufacturers’ Liability for Drugs and Medical Devices Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 258, 262 (1999); Green, supra note 14, at 219–20.
68
While section 6(c) might seemingly be improved by including a proviso that allows claims for a
manufacturer’s failure to meet its research and reporting responsibilities to the FDA, robust warning
claim enforcement (without preemption interference) appears a better way for products liability law to
perform its oversight of those responsibilities.
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IV. WARNING OF DANGERS IN PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS
Warning issues in cases involving prescription drugs in many ways
parallel those issues in other types of products liability cases. Yet, as seen
in connection with design defectiveness,69 prescription drugs raise a variety
of special problems for products liability litigation. While design
defectiveness is the most prevalent claim in most products liability cases,70
warning claims dominate prescription drug litigation.71
Several important warning issues recur in cases involving drugs. One
concerns the theories of liability applicable to this type of case. Another
involves the regulatory backdrop to this area of the law, provided by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, administered by the FDA.
A further issue is whom a manufacturer of such products should warn—the
doctor and the patient, or just the doctor. Whether a warning or instruction
about a drug is “adequate” is usually the principal issue in this type of
litigation. A final question is whether pharmacists should have a duty to
warn patients about prescription drug risks at all, and, if so, what the scope
of that duty should be. A wealth of information is available on each of
these important issues,72 and each is briefly considered here.

69

See supra Part III.
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 1.3.
“Failure to instruct or warn is the major basis of liability for manufacturers of prescription
drugs and medical devices.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. d (1998).
72
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998); 5 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, §§ 50.01–.08 (providing an overview of drug litigation and liability issues);
Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness, supra note 14, at 1052–53 (exploring drug ineffectiveness as a basis for
liability); William A. Dreier, Liability for Drug Advertising, Warnings, and Frauds, 58 RUTGERS L.
REV. 615, 616–17 (2006) (addressing state and federal control over consumer information in the
pharmaceutical industry); Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes from Drug Therapy:
The Doctor, the Hospital, the Pharmacy, and the Drug Firm, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 377, 378–79 (1996)
(discussing the potential for danger with improperly prescribed drugs); Gilhooley, Addressing Risks,
supra note 6, at 350 (examining the role of the FDA in addressing drug risks); Gilhooley, Vioxx’s
History, supra note 31, at 942–43 (using the example of Vioxx to explore regulatory issues and the
need for reform); M. Stuart Madden, The Enduring Paradox of Products Liability Law Relating to
Prescription Pharmaceuticals, 21 PACE L. REV. 313, 314 (2001) (arguing that courts and legislatures
have taken a protective approach to drug liability cases); James T. O’Reilly, Pin the Tail on the Other
Donkey: Allocating and Avoiding Injury Losses After Drug or Device Approval, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
559, 571–72 (2007) (exploring potential solutions for better protection of patients in drug liability
cases); Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 14, at 136–37 (discussing liability issues that arise when a
class of patients experiences negative side effects despite full compliance with FDA regulations);
Stapleton, supra note 14, at 993 (comparing prescription drug liability issues in the United States to the
European Union); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L.
REV. 883, 931–49 (1996) (examining problems with the current drug regulation scheme); Schwartz,
Prescription Products, supra note 65, at 1363–64, 1369–85 (reviewing proposed changes to drug
liability in the Restatement (Third)); see generally Chester Chuang, Note, Is There a Doctor in the
House? Using Failure-To-Warn Liability To Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1452 (2000) (analyzing warning liability for online prescribing).
70
71
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A. The Liability Theory Puzzle
Settling on a proper theory of liability for inadequate warnings and
instructions has been of greater interest in cases involving prescription
drugs than any other type of product. Courts widely apply all three
theories of liability to cases of this type—negligence, breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, and strict liability in tort73—as well as special
warning liability provisions of state products liability statutes.74 Courts
have been drawn to negligence principles in warning cases more than in
cases involving other types of defects,75 and this has been especially true
where prescription drugs are involved. Except for cases of contamination,
drugs were largely exempted from strict liability in tort from the very start
of modern products liability law in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,76 and courts have continued to apply negligence
principles—and to reject true strict liability principles—in landmark
prescription drug cases over the years.77
The reasons for preferring negligence principles to true strict liability
in drug warning cases run broad and deep,78 but they are worth
summarizing here.
First, banning foreseeability from the liability
calculus—the principal way in which strict liability distinguishes itself
from negligence—does violence to basic principles of justice and fair
play.79 Another reason for preferring negligence principles in this context
has been the belief that the extra deterrent effect of strict liability is less
necessary for products whose warnings must be specifically approved prior
to marketing by the FDA,80 as discussed below. A related reason is the
73

See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Ky. 2004).
See Graham v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 513–14 (6th Cir. 2003) (addressing an Ohio
statute that defines warning defects in negligence terms); Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245,
1263–64 (N.J. 1999) (holding that direct marketing to consumers creates a duty to warn of defects, as
an exception to New Jersey’s codification of the learned intermediary doctrine).
75
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.2.
76
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. j–k (1965); Madden, supra note 72, at
321–24.
77
See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting strict liability and
concluding that comment k is the appropriate test for determining responsibility for defectively
designed drugs); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (finding that in warning
cases, negligence and strict liability are “functional equivalents”); see also Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923–24 (Mass. 1998) (discussing the functional equivalency of
negligence and strict liability in the case of breast implants). But see Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d
1347, 1350–51 (Cal. 1996) (holding that while “strict liability is to some extent a hybrid of traditional
strict liability and negligence doctrine,” because a manufacturer’s “strict liability” duty to warn
embraces only risks “known to the scientific community at the time” of manufacture, strict liability in
tort and warranty nevertheless remain viable claims in drug warning cases).
78
See OWEN, supra note 14, §§ 6.2, 10.3.
79
See David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277 (2009); David G.
Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 427, 437, 448 (1993).
80
See Brown, 751 P.2d at 482–83 (holding that defendant drug manufacturer could not be held
strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug “so long as the drug was properly prepared and
74
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possibility that strict liability may result in too much deterrence, that
pharmaceutical manufacturers may be discouraged from investing in new
prescription drugs, already extremely expensive to develop and bring to
market,81 for fear of financial ruin if the new product possesses unexpected
problems. For these and other reasons, while most courts in this context
continue to apply “strict” liability by name to warning cases, the principles
they in fact apply are nothing more than negligence. The Third
Restatement follows this approach in limiting a manufacturer’s warning
responsibility in prescription drug cases to a duty to provide “reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm.”82
B. Regulation by the FDA
Prescription drug litigation must be considered against the backdrop of
the relatively strict regulation provided by the FDA.83 The FDA regulates
both the safety and effectiveness of prescription pharmaceuticals and
certain medical devices.84 In addition to ensuring that prescription drugs
are safe and effective before they are sold in interstate commerce, the FDA
approves all information a manufacturer plans to provide physicians on a
drug’s recommended use, contraindications, risks, and side-effects.
Underlying the regulatory scheme are two assumptions reflecting the
special types of dangers that inhere in drugs classified as prescription
pharmaceuticals. First is the belief that the risks in many drugs are so
complex and dangerous that the FDA must determine their safety and
effectiveness before they can be marketed at all. The second premise is
that the potential risks of improperly using many drugs are so substantial as
to require professional medical judgment and supervision by doctors and
nurse practitioners, rendering such products available to consumers only
through prescriptions written by such health professionals.
The principal federal statute regulating the quality of drugs is the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, originally enacted by Congress in
1938.85 The Act’s key provisions prohibit the sale of “any food, drug,
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities that were either known or reasonably
scientifically knowable at the time of distribution”).
81
See supra note 38.
82
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
83
The FDA’s regulatory problems were previously noted. See Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History, supra
note 31, at 960–61. Nevertheless, the FDA’s pre-marketing approval process for prescription drugs is
rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive. See supra note 38; see also Schwartz & Goldberg, supra
note 14, at 145 (explaining that the FDA monitors more than 10,000 drugs on the market and receives
more than 400,000 problem reports in a year).
84
“Drugs” over which the FDA has authority are defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006) as
“articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” A “device”
subject to regulation is defined in § 321(h)(3) as “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, . . . or other similar or related article [that] is intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (2006).
85
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–392 (2006).
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device, . . . or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded” and require
FDA approval of all new drugs prior to marketing.87 The Act addresses
warnings and instructions through its requirement that drug labels not be
“misbranded.”88 The Act requires manufacturers to provide adequate
information on the purpose, proper dosage, and possible dangers to
consumers for over-the-counter (“OTC”) drugs,89 and to medical
professionals for prescription drugs. A prescription drug is one that,
“because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the
method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use,” is safe
only when prescribed and used under the supervision of a licensed medical
practitioner,90 and such drugs must be labeled accordingly.91 Labels for
OTC drugs must state the drug’s active ingredients and “established
name”;92 must contain information on dosages, duration of use, directions
for use, and warnings against dangerous uses;93 and must describe the
drug’s effectiveness, side-effects, and contraindications.94
C. Adequacy
Principles of adequacy applicable to product warnings generally95
apply as well to warnings required for prescription drugs, forming the
center of a manufacturer’s duty to warn. Liability for failing to warn is
premised on a defendant’s failure to provide users and consumers adequate
information about a product danger or how to avoid it.96 Many courts have
stated what makes a warning “adequate.” A frequently cited formulation
of adequacy is from Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc.,97 where the
court explained that, to be adequate, a warning

86

Id. § 331(a).
Id. § 355(a). This requirement applies to “any new drug,” including over-the-counter drugs.
See, e.g., id. § 321(g)(1) (defining the term “drug”).
88
Id. §§ 352–353.
89
The process by which a drug may be determined to be an OTC drug as opposed to a
prescription drug is described in 21 C.F.R. § 330.10, which provides a detailed process for determining
a drug’s safety and effectiveness that includes a benefit-to-risk ratio. See 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(iii);
see also 21 C.F.R § 330.10(a)(4)(vi) (“A drug shall be permitted for OTC sale and use by the laity
unless, because of its toxicity or other potential for harmful effect or because of the method or
collateral measures necessary to its use, it may safely be sold and used only under the supervision of a
practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs.”).
90
21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A)–(B).
91
Prescription drugs must bear labels stating, “CAUTION: Federal law prohibits dispensing
without prescription,” and must provide any special directions for use and cautionary statements
contained in the prescription. See id. § 353(b)(2), (4).
92
Id. § 352(e).
93
Id. § 352(f).
94
Id. § 352(n).
95
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3.
96
See id., §§ 9.2–9.3.
97
727 F.2d 330, 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984).
87
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must provide a complete disclosure of the existence and
extent of the risk involved. A warning must (1) be designed
so it can reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the
consumer; (2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of
the specific risks involved with the product; and (3) be of an
intensity justified by the magnitude of the risk.98
Another court aptly observed that a warning’s adequacy depends on a
balance of many factors, including
the severity of the danger; . . . the likelihood that the warning
will catch the attention of those who will foreseeably use the
product and convey the nature of the danger to them; . . . the
intensity and form of the warning; . . . and the cost of
improving the strength or mode of the warning.99
The Third Restatement notes that determining a warning’s adequacy
requires focusing on its “content and comprehensibility, intensity of
expression, and the characteristics of expected user groups.”100
More concisely, it might be said that to be adequate, a warning must
provide a reasonable amount and type of information about a product’s
material risks and how to avoid them in a manner calculated to reach and
be understood by those likely to need the information.101 The adequacy of
a warning is often bound up with the issue of who should be warned, so
that a warning ordinarily will not be adequate unless it warns persons
foreseeably threatened by a product hazard or others in the best position—
such as doctors—to act on warnings to protect persons subject to the
hazard.102 Whether a manufacturer or other seller has provided sufficient
information about a product’s hazards is especially fact intensive, such that

98
Id. at 338 (internal citations omitted). Other courts still rely on this formulation. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 65 P.3d 245, 248 (Nev. 2003) (holding that in order for a product
warning to be ruled adequate, the warning “must (1) be designed so it can reasonably be expected to
catch the attention of the consumer; (2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of the specific
risks involved with the product; and (3) be of an intensity justified by the magnitude of the risk”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
99
Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 844 (La. 1987) (internal citations omitted); see also Gray
v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004) (“To be legally adequate, the warning
should (1) attract the attention of those that the product could harm; (2) explain the mechanism and
mode of injury; and (3) provide instructions on ways to safely use the product to avoid injury.”).
100
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) cmt. i (1998).
101
The first half of this formulation concerns the “substantive” adequacy of the warning’s
informational content, and the latter half concerns the “procedural” adequacy of the form of its
conveyance. On this distinction, see OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3.
102
See Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The factual
determination of whether an adequate warning was given is often interwoven with the question of
whether the defendant manufacturer has a duty to warn, and if so, to whom that duty is owed.”
(emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
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the adequacy of warnings and instructions normally, but not always,103 is a
factual question for the jury to decide.104
In the context of drug warnings, the manufacturer must convey all
material information on possible risks to doctors, comprehensible to the
general practitioner as well as to the specialist, or to consumers,
comprehensible to them if the circumstances warrant.105 For a drug
warning to be “adequate,” it must describe the scope of the danger;106 the
effects of misuse, including the failure to follow instructions; and the
physical aspects of the warning and broader method of conveyance must
be likely to alert recipients to the danger.107 Other aspects of a drug
warning’s adequacy include such matters as the effect of a manufacturer’s
“overpromotion” of a drug’s safety108 and whether warnings should be
103
See Austin v. Will-Burt Co., 361 F.3d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that a warning may be
adequate as a matter of law when it specifically warns against the very risk that causes a plaintiff’s
harm); Calhoun v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 768 So. 2d 57, 61 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
adequacy becomes a question of law when the warning is “accurate, clear, and unambiguous”); Martin
v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (N.Y. 1993) (explaining that “whether a given warning is legally
adequate or presents a factual question for a jury to decide requires a careful analysis of the warning’s
language”); see also 2 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.03[1][b]
(2009) (noting that “[c]ourts frequently state that the adequacy of warnings is a question for the trier of
fact”).
104
See McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that when a risk described
on a drug label is low enough to induce a doctor to undertake the risk, the court could not rule that “no
reasonable jury could conclude that a warning was inadequate”); Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (explaining that in a prescription drug liability case:
“[A]n adequate warning is one reasonable under the circumstances. Specifically, the warning must:
(1) indicate the scope of the danger; (2) communicate the extent or seriousness of the potential danger;
(3) alert a reasonably prudent practitioner to the danger; and (4) be conveyed in a satisfactory
manner.”).
105
See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1257 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a warning must
include all material risks, meaning those to which a reasonable patient would attach significance in
deciding whether to take the drug); Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 256 (Ohio 1996) (finding
that drug warnings were inadequate, meaning there was not a reasonable disclosure of “all risks
inherent in the use of the drug of which the manufacturer, being held to the standards of an expert in the
field, knew or should have known to exist”).
106
See Madsen, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; see also Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d
848, 853 (10th Cir. 2003). Compare Myers v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 170 P.3d 254, 262–65 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to hold Accutane warnings adequate as a matter of law under the learned
intermediary doctrine on motion to dismiss), with Gerber v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d
907, 917–19 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that the Accutane package insert adequately warned
dermatologists of the risk of birth defects when prescribed for pregnant women).
107
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3.
108
As with other types of products, risks in pharmaceuticals must not be unduly downplayed, nor
safety “overpromoted”; instead, a manufacturer’s communications to doctors must present a reasonably
balanced portrayal of the effectiveness and dangers of a drug. See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp.
2d 984, 998 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“An overpromotion theory is one way that a plaintiff in a failure-to-warn
case can overcome the manufacturer’s argument either (1) that it provided adequate warnings or (2)
that the doctor’s decision to prescribe a drug despite his awareness of its dangers was an intervening
cause sufficient to vitiate the manufacturer’s liability.”), aff’d, 358 F.3d 659, 360–61 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Ebel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 767, 775–76 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that while
overpromotion can include promotion of off-label use not approved by the FDA, there was insufficient
proof thereof); Madden, supra note 72, at 330 (“An otherwise suitable warning may be vitiated by the
conduct of the manufacturer or those acting at [its direction] . . . if they promote the product in such a
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109

made in foreign languages. The California Supreme Court addressed the
latter issue in Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.,110 where an infant contracted Reye’s
Syndrome after his Spanish-speaking mother gave him St. Joseph’s Aspirin
for Children to relieve his cold symptoms. The aspirin’s label warned of
the Reye’s Syndrome risk in English but not in Spanish. Although the
FDA specifically permitted English-only labeling, the plaintiff claimed that
the label’s failure to include a Spanish warning rendered it inadequate.
The court reviewed a number of related factors: the web of rules on
foreign-language labeling requirements in various other contexts adopted
by the California legislature; the FDA’s quite specific rules governing
foreign-language labeling that permitted, but did not require, such labeling;
and the multiplicity of health, social, cost, and practicability factors.
Considering all these factors, the court concluded that foreign-language
labeling requirements were better determined by legislatures and
regulatory agencies than by the courts. Because other branches of
government had determined that English-only warnings were sufficient,
the court decided that it should apply the same rule to the case.111
An example of the adequacy issue at play in a normal prescription drug
case is Martin v. Hacker,112 in which a doctor treated the decedent, Mr.
Martin, for hypertension (high blood pressure) with two drugs
manufactured by the defendant, including Reserpine. Mr. Martin became
severely depressed and fatally shot himself in the head, allegedly because
of the Reserpine. The issue was whether the information provided by the
manufacturer to physicians about the drug’s risks was adequate as a matter
of law.
The package insert specified among the drug’s
“CONTRAINDICATIONS,” “mental depression (especially with suicidal
tendencies)”; and among its “WARNINGS,” the package insert stated:

fashion as to obscure or lessen the cautionary impact of the seller’s warnings.”); Janet Fairchild,
Annotation, Promotional Efforts Directed Toward Prescribing Physician as Affecting Prescription
Drug Manufacturer’s Liability for Product-Caused Injury, 94 A.L.R.3D 1080, 1080 (1979). Compare
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 655–56 (Cal. 1973) (finding overpromotion of
Chloromycetin, a broad-spectrum antibiotic, downplaying the risk of fatal aplastic anemia), with
Spinden v. Johnson & Johnson, 427 A.2d 597, 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (holding that AMA
Journal ads did not amount to overpromotion).
109
See Christopher S. Maciejewski, The Dilemma Over Foreign-Language Labeling of Over-theCounter Drugs, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 129, 144–48 (1994).
110
863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993).
111
Id. at 169–70, 174–76. Noting that the FDA stresses the importance of “uniformity in
presentation and clarity of message,” the court concluded:
To preserve that uniformity and clarity, to avoid adverse impacts upon the
warning requirements mandated by the federal regulatory scheme, and in deference
to the superior technical and procedural lawmaking resources of legislative and
administrative bodies, we adopt the legislative/regulatory standard of care that
mandates nonprescription drug package warnings in English only.
Id. at 177.
112
628 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1993).
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Extreme caution should be exercised in treating patients with
a history of mental depression. Discontinue the drug at first
sign of despondency, early morning insomnia, loss of
appetite, impotence, or self-deprecation.
Drug-induced
depression may persist for several months after drug
withdrawal and may be severe enough to result in suicide.113
Carefully applying a full list of adequacy factors, the court concluded
that the warning was commensurate with the risk, including possible
adverse consequences of use (death from suicide was specifically
mentioned); the insert’s language was accurate, clear, direct, unequivocal,
sufficiently forceful, complete, consistent, devoid of contradiction, and the
information was current;114 and, when read as a whole, the meaning
conveyed about the possible consequences of taking the drug was
unmistakable.115 The court thus determined that the warnings were
adequate as a matter of law.116
A recurring adequacy issue, sometimes dubbed “procedural adequacy,”
concerns the method by which the information is conveyed to the
recipient.117 There are several standard avenues of communication
between drug companies and physicians for transmitting information about
drugs, and a manufacturer must select the best methods reasonably
available to convey important new information on drug dangers to doctors
who need the information. The Physician’s Desk Reference (“PDR”),
updated periodically, contains copies of package inserts for many
prescription drugs. Other sources of information that are more complete
than the PDR are Facts and Comparisons (updated monthly), the annual
United States Pharmacopeial Drug Information’s (“USP DI”) Vol. 1: Drug
Information for the Health Care Professional, and Vol. 2: Advice for the
Patient—Drug Information in Lay Language. Information on warnings
and contraindications is readily available to physicians from these
reference works, and the warnings in package inserts and the PDR
ordinarily are adequate to alert physicians to drug hazards.
113

Id. at 1309–10.
To be adequate, a warning must be timely. A long series of cases involving Aralen, a drug
used in the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis and eventually linked to irreversible eye damage in some
users, established certain principles. To be timely, a warning of side-effects must be made promptly
upon discovery of the coexistence of the side-effect and use of the drug, even though a causal
relationship has not been clearly proved. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir.
1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84–85 (8th Cir. 1966). Since the drug company is
held to have the knowledge of an expert, to be timely, a warning must be given as soon as the risks are
pointed out in reputable scientific journals. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 921–23
(8th Cir. 1970).
115
Martin, 628 N.E.2d at 1312–15.
116
Id. at 1315. But in this context, as in others, adequacy usually is a factual issue for the jury.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
117
OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3.
114
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New developments, however, may render information in the PDR
obsolete, and a manufacturer’s failure promptly to update the medical
profession may subject it to liability. If information is critical, the
manufacturer may need to send “Dear Doctor” letters advising physicians
individually of the new information.118 The typically busy doctor,
however, may not regularly consult the PDR or even routinely read “Dear
Doctor” letters. If the need to warn is compelling enough, reasonable care
may require a drug company to use its salespersons who regularly call on
doctors (“drug reps,” formerly called “detail men”) to warn them
personally of a particular risk.119
Unlike the controversial provision on design defects in prescription
drugs discussed above,120 the Third Restatement defines a manufacturer’s
responsibility for warning defects in prescription drugs in conventional
negligence terms that give no cause to cavil. In section 6(d), the Third
Restatement provides, “A prescription drug or medical device is not
reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not
provided to” healthcare providers or patients, depending on the
applicability of the learned intermediary doctrine,121 as discussed below.
Principles of adequacy are embraced by the requirement that warnings and
instructions be “reasonable,” and the limitation on responsibility to
“foreseeable” risks reflects the now well-established principle, discussed
above, that the law should not hold manufacturers of drugs or any other
type of product responsible for harm that is unforeseeable or otherwise
unavoidable under the prevailing state of the art, an important aspect of
products liability law examined elsewhere in greater depth.122
D. The Law’s Duty Shield: Manufacturers
1. The Doctor in the Middle: The “Learned Intermediary Doctrine”
In addition to the required pre-market approval by the FDA, a
118
As to the standards of adequacy for such letters, see Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 356 N.E.2d
779, 783–84 (Ill. 1976).
119
For an early, leading case that examines factors bearing on whether a company must warn
doctors in this manner, see Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991–92 (8th Cir. 1969)
(explaining that the failure to use detail men to alert doctors of possible eye damage was unreasonable
in light of the fact that the PDR and “Dear Doctor” letters might not warn fast enough).
The FDA now publishes and regularly updates comprehensive drug, biologic, medical device, and
dietary supplement safety information on its MedWatch Safety Information and Adverse Event
Reporting web site, available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY.htm. See, e.g., Stephen E.
Scheve & Andrew E. Costa, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine After FDA’s Drug Watch and
PhRMA’s Clinical Study Results Database, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 12 (2006) (analyzing the
implications of two online databases that publish comprehensive drug safety information).
120
See supra Part II.
121
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
122
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 10.3; Owen, Bending Nature, supra note 17.
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prescription drug’s warnings and instructions must be provided to health
professionals—doctors and nurse practitioners—rather than directly to
patients.
Such “learned intermediaries” stand between the drug
manufacturer and the patient, dispensing what medications and information
they deem best. Thus, the learned intermediary doctrine is an exception to
the general rule that manufacturers must take all reasonable steps to
provide warnings directly to a product’s ultimate user or consumer.123
Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the prescription drug
manufacturer’s duty to inform consumers runs only indirectly through
physicians, rather than directly to consumers.124
The basic rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine is quite
powerful: medical professionals, and only medical professionals, have the
requisite knowledge, training, and judgment to properly match particular
drugs with distinctive benefits and dangers to particular patients with
distinctive constitutions and medical conditions, and to properly monitor
the results thereafter. If manufacturers fulfill their obligations to provide
full and fair information to healthcare professionals, those professionals
should be able to make intelligent, reasonably safe, and effective treatment
decisions.125 In turn, a prescribing doctor is obliged under the law of torts
to inform the patient of a drug’s benefits and risks (as well as the benefits
and risks of no treatment and alternative treatments), and to monitor how

123

See Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 836–37 (Conn. 2001).
For contextual analysis of this doctrine, see Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and
Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries To Transmit Product Safety Information,
46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1195–96 (1996); Pamela R. Ferguson, Liability for Pharmaceutical
Products: A Critique of the ‘Learned Intermediary’ Rule, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 66–68
(1992); Richard B. Goetz & Karen R. Growdon, A Defense of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 63
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 421, 422 (2008); Jeffrey W. Kemp & Lindsy Nicole Alleman, The Bulk Supplier,
Sophisticated User, and Learned Intermediary Doctrines Since the Adoption of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 927, 947 (2007); Nancy K. Plant, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some
New Medicine for an Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1996); Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug
Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The Case for Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 656–58 (2007); Charles J. Walsh et al., The Learned Intermediary Doctrine:
The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 844 (1996); see also Chuang,
supra note 72, at 1463–76; Jennifer Girod, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: An Efficient
Protection for Patients, Past and Present, 40 IND. L. REV. 397, 397 (2007).
125
Judge Wisdom well explained the doctrine’s rationale in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories:
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and
varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into
account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His
is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers.
The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment
bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies
then, who must warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold
over the counter, in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the
prescribing physician, who acts as a “learned intermediary” between manufacturer
and consumer.
498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 763–64 (Ky.
2004).
124

2010]

DANGERS IN PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

761

126

the drug affects the patient.
Sprouting in the 1960s,127 and becoming firmly rooted in the early
1970s,128 the learned intermediary doctrine is an established fixture in
American products liability law, adopted now by courts in a large majority
of states.129 It may well be that the foundations of this doctrine are
weakening,130 but the rule was explicitly endorsed by the Third
Restatement and appears quite firmly entrenched for now.131 Because the
doctrine defines the scope of a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s duty to
warn, application of the learned intermediary rule involves a question of
law for the court, not a factual question of adequacy for a jury.132

126
See FRANK M. MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHICS 189, 199
(1994); see also DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS § 250 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 189–93 (5th ed. 1984); George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of
Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 112 (2004).
127
See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (“[T]he purchaser’s doctor is a learned intermediary between
the purchaser and the manufacturer. If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side effect
in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms normally accompanying the side effect, there is an
excellent chance that injury to the patient can be avoided.”); Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897,
898–99 (D.D.C. 1963); see also Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327–28 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963) (“The rule seems settled that a person not reasonably expected to use the manufacturer’s drug (or
product) is not one to whom the warranty runs, and that he who uses it in a manner contrary to adequate
warnings given by the manufacturer is in the same status.”).
128
See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276; Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 142 (3d Cir.
1973); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. App. 1973) (“The entire system of
drug distribution in America is set up so as to place the responsibility of distribution and use upon
professional people. The laws and regulations prevent prescription type drugs from being purchased by
individuals without the advice, guidance and consent of licensed physicians and pharmacists. These
professionals are in the best position to evaluate the warnings put out by the drug industry.”);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971).
129
See, e.g., Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d 861, 867 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he vast majority of jurisdictions—45 out of 50 states—apply the learned intermediary doctrine to
product liability claims.”); Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2004) (“‘[T]he
[learned intermediary] doctrine either applies or is recognized . . . in 48 states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico.’”) (quoting In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806
(E.D. Tex. 2002)); Thom v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that
forty-four jurisdictions adhere to the doctrine (citing Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 838 n.11
(Conn. 2001)). But see State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007)
(rejecting the doctrine and asserting that twenty-two state high courts have not adopted the doctrine). A
few states have adopted the doctrine by statute. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(ii) (2009); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-5(c) (2009).
130
See James Ottavio Castagnera & Richard Ryan Gerner, The Gradual Enfeeblement of the
Learned Intermediary Rule and the Argument in Favor of Abandoning It Entirely, 36 TORT & INS. L.J.
119, 120 (2000) (describing a weakening of the rule due to “(1) the rise in consumer awareness, (2) the
complexity of pharmaceutical products, (3) the development of clinical pharmacies that bring their own
special expertise to bear on consumer and patient choices, and (4) the reduced time spent by patients in
doctors’ offices”).
131
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
132
See Vitanza, 778 A.2d at 840 (refusing to convert a claim—that a manufacturer, which
provided adequate warnings of Ansaid’s risks to doctors, should have placed warnings on drug
samples—into a factual question of adequacy for a jury).
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2. Exceptions to the Doctrine
When prescription drugs are dispensed under circumstances where
healthcare professionals foreseeably fail to render the type of
individualized balancing of benefits and risks contemplated by the learned
intermediary doctrine, drug manufacturers may have a duty to provide
warnings directly to patients. That is, when the rationale for the learned
intermediary doctrine falls away, the general rule—requiring
manufacturers to warn consumers directly—logically should return. This
commonsense principle has spawned the following three exceptions,133
only the first of which has much support.
The most established exception to the learned intermediary rule is for
mass immunization programs where no health professional mediates
information about drug risks for the benefit of the patient.134 Most courts
confronted with the issue have thus refused to apply the learned
intermediary rule to situations where patients are vaccinated in assemblyline fashion, often by persons other than physicians, with no opportunity
for individualized medical assessments. When people line up like
lemmings to receive a polio shot or flu vaccination at a school or other
facility for mass distribution of a vaccine, the manufacturer must take all
reasonable steps to ensure that each patient is directly provided warnings
and instructions on risks the manufacturer should know the drug
possesses.135 As an exception to the learned intermediary rule, which itself
is an exception to the manufacturer’s general obligation to warn consumers
directly, the mass immunization doctrine restores the manufacturer’s duty
to provide warnings (by leaflets or posters) directly to recipients of the
vaccine. This true exception was applied in early cases to the polio
133
Some plaintiffs’ lawyers and scholars argue for additional exceptions to the learned
intermediary doctrine, and courts occasionally assert, in dictum, the existence of one or more such
exceptions. See, e.g., Vitanza, 778 A.2d at 846–47 (listing six supposed exceptions, including
“overpromoted drugs” and “drugs withdrawn from the market,” but rejecting plaintiff’s request for a
prescription drug sample exception); In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 20004540 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (Weinstein, J.) (citing dubious authority for the existence, “[i]n unusual cases,” of the
overpromotion exception); Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The
Case for Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653 (2007) (arguing for
drug sample exception); Frank C. Woodside III & Margaret M. Maggio, The Learned Intermediary
Doctrine: Is It Eroding?, 52 FED. LAW. 28, 31 (Nov./Dec. 2005) (noting that plaintiffs sometimes
argue that overpromotion by detail reps undermines “the physician’s ability to act as an intermediary
and insist that, in this context, drug manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers directly”). To date,
however, no courts appear to have formally adopted any exceptions other than the three discussed
below.
134
See Marc A. Franklin & Joseph E. Mais, Jr., Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs:
Lessons from the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CAL. L. REV. 754, 775 (1977) (questioning the usefulness
of tort law in the mass immunization context).
135
See Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1433–34 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting the warning
provided to patients regarding the Swine Flu vaccine, which noted possible side effects, including
“fever, chills, headache, or muscle aches” and special precautions to be taken by those interested in
receiving the vaccine, namely, “[c]hildren under a certain age should not routinely receive flu
vaccine”).
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vaccine, and later to the Swine Flu vaccine.
Although a court has
wavered here or there,138 there is every reason to believe that courts will
continue to require direct warnings to consumers in similar instances of
mass immunization programs.
Another exception, sometimes mentioned, concerns birth control pills.
In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,139 the plaintiff suffered a
stroke leaving her partially paralyzed after taking the defendant’s birth
control pills for an extended period of time, during which she had seen her
physician once each year. The manufacturer provided information to
consumers via a package insert that included a warning of the risks of
blood clots but that did not specifically mention the possibility of strokes.
After suffering a stroke, the plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer had a
duty to provide full and adequate warnings directly to her, the patient, and
not just to doctors. Although all but one of the fifteen prior reported
judicial opinions had applied the learned intermediary doctrine to birth
control pills, like other prescription drugs,140 the MacDonald majority
reinstated a jury verdict for the plaintiff, reasoning that oral contraceptives
stand apart from other types of prescription medications because of the
heightened participation of patients in decisions relating to
use of “the pill”; the substantial risks affiliated with the
product’s use; the feasibility of direct warnings by the
manufacturer to the user; the limited participation of the
physician (annual prescriptions); and the possibility that oral
communications between physicians and consumers may be
insufficient or too scanty standing alone fully to apprise
consumers of the product’s dangers at the time the initial
selection of a contraceptive method is made as well as at
subsequent points when alternative methods may be

136
See Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345–46 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498
F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he manufacturer of a prescription drug who knows or has reason
to know that it will not be dispensed as such a drug must provide the consumer with adequate
information so that he can balance the risks and benefits of a given medication himself.”); Davis v.
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968).
137
See Brazzell v. United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1358 (8th Cir. 1986) (“The only warning
appellee was given . . . in no way warned of the possibility of prolonged, debilitating muscle pain.”);
Petty, 740 F.2d at 1437, 1440 (finding the given warning insufficient and affirming that the
manufacturer has a duty to warn “the ultimate consumer in a mass-immunization case”).
138
Compare Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 964 F.2d 1348, 1350–51 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding
that the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine maker satisfied its duty by providing information to the
Center for Disease Control), with Allison v. Merck & Co., Inc., 878 P.2d 948, 958–59 (Nev. 1994)
(holding that the manufacturer of a vaccine for measles, mumps, and rubella could not delegate its duty
to warn to the CDC whose information sheet made no mention of risks of blindness, deafness, and
brain damage).
139
475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
140
Id. at 65–68, 73.
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141

considered.

For these reasons, the court concluded that the learned intermediary
doctrine should not apply to birth control pill manufacturers who therefore
must provide warnings directly to ultimate users on the nature, gravity, and
likelihood of foreseeable side-effects, and who must advise consumers to
ask their doctors about any other matters about which they may be
concerned.142 The dissenting Justice, observing that manufacturers of
prescription pharmaceuticals have a duty to provide full information on all
material risks to prescribing physicians who, in turn, have a duty (under the
informed consent doctrine, redressable in a malpractice action) to provide
full information on all material risks to patients for whom they prescribe
the drug, argued that this traditional division of responsibility best allocates
risks and responsibilities among the parties.143 While MacDonald is
frequently cited as creating a new common law exception to the learned
intermediary rule for birth control pills, only a small number of federal
judges followed it, whereas other courts have uniformly rejected it and
continue to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to birth control pills as
other types of prescription pharmaceuticals.144
141

Id. at 70.
Id.
143
Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor wrote:
The rules place on drug manufacturers the duty to gather, compile, and provide to
doctors data regarding the use of their drugs, tasks for which the manufacturers are
best suited, and the rules place on doctors the burden of conveying those data to
their patients in a useful and understandable manner, a task for which doctors are
best suited. Doctors, unlike printed warnings, can tailor to the needs and abilities of
an individual patient the information that that patient needs in order to make an
informed decision whether to use a particular drug. Manufacturers are not in a
position to give adequate advice directly to those consumers whose medical histories
and physical conditions, perhaps unknown to the consumers, make them peculiarly
susceptible to risk. Prescription drugs—including oral contraceptives—differ from
other products because their dangers vary widely depending on characteristics of
individual consumers.
142

Id.

144
See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700, 704 (E.D. Tex. 1997)
(indicating that “[o]nly a single jurisdiction, Massachusetts, recognizes an exception to the doctrine for
prescription contraceptives”). Note, however, that an FDA regulation requires birth control
manufacturers to provide warnings of dangers in lay language directly to users. See Patient Package
Inserts for Oral Contraceptives, 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2009). This means that a negligence per se action
may be available against such a manufacturer who fails to provide adequate risk information directly to
users. But the violation-of-regulation approach was explicitly rejected in Martin v. Ortho
Pharmaceuticals, Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 353, 355–57 (Ill. 1996) (concerning the risk of birth limb
reductions from pills used in the first trimester of pregnancy).
Consider also that the MacDonald exception might create an “over-warning” problem for birth
control pills, detrimental to most women’s health. A Gallup poll in 1985 showed that “Americans
greatly overestimate the risks and understate the effectiveness of birth control methods, particularly the
pill, leaving them vulnerable to unintended pregnancies.” According to the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, unwanted pregnancies and more than a million abortions each year
needlessly threaten women’s lives. “The society’s survey found that people are particularly
misinformed about the birth control pill, which the group said is the most effective and safest
contraceptive for many women.” Three quarters of the women surveyed thought that the pill presents
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A third exception, developed more recently, arose in response to
direct-to-consumer advertising. It may be that the learned intermediary
doctrine is out of touch with how modern medicine is practiced in a world
where prescription drug manufacturers jump over health professionals to
consumers via television and other mass advertising.145 In Perez v. Wyeth
Laboratories,146 the plaintiffs experienced problems after being implanted
with the Norplant contraceptive device. The plaintiffs sued Wyeth, which
had properly warned doctors of possible complications, for failing to
provide warnings directly to patients. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the manufacturer, based on the learned intermediary doctrine
as incorporated in a New Jersey statute, and the appellate division
affirmed. In an important opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the learned intermediary doctrine should no longer
insulate prescription drug manufacturers from their duty to warn
consumers directly when they seek to influence a patient’s choice of drugs
through mass-marketing.147
The Perez court reasoned that the learned intermediary doctrine is
based on outmoded images of health care from a time when doctors gave
medical advice in their offices, made house calls on request, charged only
small sums for their advice, and prescribed medicines compounded by a
neighborhood pharmacist—all at a time when “the prevailing attitude of
substantial health risks, despite the fact that the risk of death from taking the pill is about half the
mother’s risk of death from childbirth. Pill Poll—National Survey Finds Many Have Bad Information,
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 6, 1985, at 2A.
145
See Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort
Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 139 (2002); William A.
Dreier, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Liability: An Empty Gift to Plaintiffs, 30 SETON HALL L. REV.
806, 825 (2000); Timothy S. Hall, Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Advertising with Tort Law: Is the
Law Finally Catching Up with the Market?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 333, 348–52 (2009) [hereinafter
Hall, Regulating Consumer Advertising]; Timothy S. Hall, The Promise and Peril of Direct-toConsumer Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 40–41
(2003) [hereinafter Hall, DTC Prescription Drug Promotion]; Justin L. Heather, Liability for Direct-toConsumer Advertising and Drug Information on the Internet, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 412, 420 (2001);
Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct Consumer Advertising, 65
MO. L. REV. 1101, 1116–17 (2000); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers:
Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 180 (1997); Scheve & Costa, supra
note 119, at 21; Teresa M. Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the
Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 848 (1991); Victor E. Schwartz et al.,
Marketing Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of the Continued
Viability of Traditional Principles of Law in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 32 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 333, 387 (2009); Paul F. Strain & Christina L. Gaarder, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Unsettling a Settled Question, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 377, 382,
387 (2001); Barbara J. Tyler & Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting the Burden When
Manufacturers Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 21 VT. L. REV. 1073,
1105 (1997); Jeffrey J. Wiseman, Note, Another Factor in the “Decisional Calculus”: The Learned
Intermediary Doctrine, the Physician-Patient Relationship, and Direct-to-Consumer Marketing, 52
S.C. L. REV. 993, 1016–17 (2001).
146
734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
147
Id. at 1247–49, 1264 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4).
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law and medicine was that the ‘doctor knows best.’”
Sadly, this picture
is radically different from the healthcare world that presently exists.
Today, managed healthcare organizations are mammoth businesses,
dispensing medical care and prescriptions impersonally, and medicines are
sold in supermarket pharmacy departments and “often paid for by thirdparty providers.”149 Against this backdrop, modern manufacturers of
prescription drugs mass-market their wares directly “to consumers on the
radio, television, the Internet, billboards on public transportation, and in
magazines.”150 The court observed that problems in these advertising
practices are manifest, permitting manufacturers and advertisers to
manipulate information on safety and effectiveness that, at best, presents a
diluted picture of a product’s risks.151
Since Perez, several other courts have reconsidered the learned
intermediary doctrine in light of direct-to-consumer advertising, the sale of
prescription pharmaceuticals over the Internet from abroad, and the general
depersonalization of healthcare delivery in the modern world. For eight
years, all courts considering the issue rejected Perez and continued to
apply the learned intermediary doctrine.152 But in 2007, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, refused to adopt
the learned intermediary doctrine in State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp.
v. Karl.153 While acknowledging that most states have adopted the
doctrine, and that many lower court decisions have applied it, the majority
opinion lists twenty-one states whose high courts have not adopted this
special drug exception to the ordinary duty of manufacturers to provide
warnings directly to consumers.154 Agreeing with Perez that the learned
intermediary doctrine is outmoded in the modern medical world, the Karl
majority held that “manufacturers of prescription drugs are subject to the
same duty to warn consumers about the risks of their products as other

148

Id. at 1246–47 (quoting Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 299 (Conn. 1983)).
Id. at 1247.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1252–53 (citing Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1456 (1999)).
152
See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the learned intermediary doctrine applies); Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360,
1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (declining to adopt an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine);
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 547 n.30 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that no state has
followed New Jersey’s exception and that, unless the law changes, Pennsylvania also does not have
such an exception), aff’d, 521 F.3d 253, 276 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F.
Supp. 2d 791, 812 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (stating that “[t]he Court . . . could not apply Perez’s logic
even if it desired to do so,” and if it did, the plaintiffs still would not succeed), aff’d, 447 F.3d 861 (6th
Cir. 2006).
153
647 S.E.2d 899, 900–01 (W. Va. 2007).
154
The court lists Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 905.
149
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manufacturers.”
Concurring, Justice Maynard observed that “[p]atients
can read the labels, instructions and warnings, and if the manufacturer
makes them clear enough, then patients can be proactive in working with
their doctors to receive the best care.”156
Now that Perez is accompanied by Karl, it may well be that other
jurisdictions will begin to rethink the logic of applying a rigid, paternalistic
doctrine that developed under very different circumstances than exist
today.157 But two decisions do not make a trend, and it is still too early to
know when other courts may begin to recognize the wisdom of broadening
the duty of pharmaceutical manufacturers to share vital information about
drug risks directly with consumers. In the meantime, it should be noted
that only one of the three exceptions to the learned intermediary rule, the
exception for mass immunization programs, is generally accepted, and it is
even applied infrequently.158 While the Third Restatement adopts the
learned intermediary rule, it provides a general exception wide enough to
accommodate all three exceptions,159 and it specifically leaves open the
question of whether a new exception should be created for drugs that are
mass-marketed directly to consumers.160
E. The Law’s Duty Shield: Pharmacists
Pharmacists dispense millions of drug prescriptions in America each
day.161 While doctors prescribe pharmaceutical drugs, they typically know
much less about such drugs (which they normally study for only one to
three semesters) than pharmacists who study all aspects of drug therapy for
five to seven years.162 For whatever reasons, many doctors order
inappropriate prescription drugs for their patients, causing numerous
patients to suffer adverse drug reactions—many of which could easily be
prevented if patients received adequate drug warnings, which often they do
155

Id. at 914.
Id. at 917, 919 (Maynard, J., concurring).
See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1219 (D.N.M. 2008) (predicting that
New Mexico would not adopt the learned intermediary doctrine: “There is nothing inconsistent with a
patient relying on his or her doctor, and reading warning labels. The informed consumer is likely to
ask the physician more questions, and informed responses may increase reliance rather than decrease
reliance. The warnings may make the relationship more dynamic rather than one-sided.”).
158
See Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that “[a]ll of the
vaccine cases recognize the theoretical validity of the ‘mass immunization exception’ to the learned
intermediary rule, but very few have found situations where its application is warranted”).
159
The Third Restatement provides that a prescription drug or medical device is defective if the
manufacturer fails to provide reasonable warnings of foreseeable risks to: (1) the doctor or other
healthcare provider, or (2) the patient, if the manufacturer should know that healthcare providers are
“not in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
160
Id. at cmt. e.
161
See Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990: Redefining Pharmacists’
Legal Responsibilities, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 417, 418 (1998).
162
See id. at 440–41.
156
157
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not. Studies show that a large proportion of drug prescriptions contain
errors that result in adverse drug events,163 and that most persons are
inadequately warned, either by their doctors or pharmacists, of drug
interactions and other hazards of prescription drugs.164 These facts suggest
that pharmacists should have a duty of reasonable care to warn patients of
hazards in prescription drugs.165
Because pharmacists are more in the nature of service providers, like
doctors, than retail merchants, like hatters, they are subject to liability for
selling prescription drugs only in negligence, not strict liability.166 In
filling prescriptions, pharmacists are held to the highest standard of care,
such that a pharmacist who makes a mistake in filling a prescription is
almost certainly responsible for any resulting harm.167 But pharmacists
long have been held to have no duty, apart from not misrepresenting facts
about a drug,168 other than to dispense drugs accurately according to the
terms of a valid prescription.169 In particular, pharmacists simply have no
general duty to warn patients—not even to pass along package inserts
(intended for physicians) containing detailed warnings—of hazards or side163
See, e.g., Michele L. Hornish, Just What the Doctor Ordered—Or Was It?: Missouri
Pharmacists’ Duty of Care in the 21st Century, 65 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2000) (“[C]ourts have
begun to recognize that pharmacists are the last chance that the system has to correct itself, and that
pharmacists are experts in pharmaceutical science and should be treated as professionals.”).
164
See Huang, supra note 161, at 419 (citing a survey that found that only forty-four percent of
the respondents reported that their pharmacists warned them about drug interactions).
165
See Kenneth R. Baker, The OBRA 90 Mandate and Its Developing Impact on the Pharmacist’s
Standard of Care, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 503, 518 (1996); David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist’s Duty
Under OBRA-90 Standards, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 475, 494–97 (1997).
166
See Parker v. St. Vincent Hosp., 919 P.2d 1104, 1106, 1112 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); Madison v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 595 S.E.2d 493, 494, 496 (S.C. 2004); Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d
425, 435 (Tenn. 1994); Schaerrer v. Stewart’s Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922, 933 (Utah 2003); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(e) (1998); Timothy E. Travers,
Annotation, Druggist’s Civil Liability for Injuries Sustained as Result of Negligence in Incorrectly
Filling Drug Prescriptions, 3 A.L.R.4TH 270, 276 (1981). But see Heredia v. Johnson, 827 F. Supp.
1522, 1525 (D. Nev. 1993) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the
claim of strict liability); Griffith v. Blatt, 51 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Or. 2002) (finding that a pharmacist who
sold prescription lotion was a “seller” under section 402A and, hence, possibly subject to strict liability
in tort for failing to warn).
167
See, e.g., Marston v. Walgreen Co., 907 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (providing an
example of filling a prescription for allopurinol with glipizide pills); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511,
513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding negligence in filling a prescription for birth control pills with a
tranquilizer, which resulted in an unwanted child); Burke v. Bean, 363 S.W.2d 366, 366–68 (Tex. App.
1962) (addressing the sale of Oxsoralen capsules when Oxacholin tablets were prescribed).
168
See, e.g., Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 894 A.2d 563, 579 (Md. 2006) (holding that the
learned intermediary doctrine does not protect a pharmacy from breach of express warranty claims for
incorrectly stating that a drug could be taken with food or milk if it upset the client’s stomach).
169
See, e.g., Kampe v. Howard Stark Prof’l Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (ruling that properly filling legal prescription fulfills the pharmacist’s duty), abrogated by
Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting “the suggestion in Kampe that the
only functions which a pharmacist must perform to fulfill his duty is to dispense drugs according to a
physician’s prescription”); see also Huang, supra note 161, at 417–18 (explaining that the law clearly
provides that a pharmacist has a duty to properly dispense drugs, but that the law is ambiguous as to
any further duty).
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effects in prescription drugs that they dispense.
The pharmacist’s
immunity from a general duty to warn patients has been justified on a
number of grounds, including the learned intermediary doctrine’s
placement of warning responsibilities solely on doctors and nurse
practitioners who theoretically are aware of a patient’s treatment needs as
well as the benefits and dangers of particular prescription drugs;171 the
burdens on pharmacists of having to second-guess decisions of prescribing
doctors; the confusion of patients receiving conflicting information from
their doctors and pharmacists; and an assumption that doctors are simply
better skilled than pharmacists at evaluating the possible consequences of
prescription medications.172
But cracks are beginning to appear in the pharmacist’s general
immunity from a duty to warn, reflecting legislative requirements that
pharmacists monitor and counsel their clients about prescription drugs,173 a
development that has stimulated increased education and professionalism
in this field.174 In a number of cases, courts have held that pharmacists
may have a duty of reasonable care to warn in certain circumstances. First,
pharmacists are subject to liability in negligence for failing to recognize a
170

See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 279, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(discussing numerous cases concerning diabetes medication and finding that there was no general duty
to warn in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, or West Virginia); Deed v. Walgreen Co., 927 A.2d
1001, 1002–04 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding that a pharmacy had no duty to warn when a customer
died from acute toxicity resulting from 149 prescriptions filled according to physician directions in the
year prior to her death); Pysz v. Henry’s Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that it was the doctor’s responsibility, not the pharmacist’s, to warn plaintiff of addiction risk
in Quaaludes dispensed for more than nine years); Frye v. Medicare–Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557,
561 (Ill. 1992) (finding no duty to warn of the drug’s interactions); Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley
Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381, 385, 387–88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no duty to warn of
drowsiness that caused car accident); Moore v. Mem’l Hosp. of Gulfport, 825 So. 2d 658, 661 (Miss.
2002) (ruling that a pharmacist was not liable for failing to warn a pregnant woman that Diovan was
contraindicated for pregnancy where her child suffered kidney failure as a result); Laws v. Johnson,
799 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no liability for removing a package insert that
warned of risk of heart attack); Schaerrer, 79 P.3d at 925 (holding that a pharmacist who compounded
and sold Phen-fen without warning of risks was not liable for negligence); McKee v. Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1046–47 (Wash. 1989) (providing an example where pharmacists refilled
potentially addictive amphetamine, prescribed as an appetite suppressant, for ten years without warning
of addiction risk or passing on drug insert that warned about it).
171
See Springhill Hosps., Inc. v. Larrimore, 5 So. 3d 513, 521 (Ala. 2008) (applying the learned
intermediary doctrine to bar pharmacist liability for alleged negligence in filling a prescription that led
to the death of a patient).
172
See Moore v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 236 F. Supp. 2d 509, 512–13 (D. Md. 2002) (“[I]t is unwise
to impose liability on a pharmacist for filling a prescription signed by the physician, because the
physician is in a better position to evaluate the patient’s medical needs.”); Chamblin v. K-Mart Corp.,
612 S.E.2d 25, 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the learned intermediary rule properly shields
pharmacists from duty to warn of drug side-effects); Moore, 825 So. 2d at 666 (finding that the learned
intermediary doctrine protects pharmacists); Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 469
(Tex. App. 2000) (concluding that the general no-duty rule should be retained); Schaerrer, 79 P.3d at
929 (noting that information may confuse consumers).
173
See, e.g., McKee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Huang,
supra note 161, at 433–34.
174
See Huang, supra note 161, at 440.
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clear and obvious error present on the face of a prescription.
So, if a
prescription fails to state a medication’s maximum dosage, it is patently
defective on its face, and a pharmacist may be subject to liability in
negligence for failing to check with the prescribing physician or inform the
patient of this important dosage fact.176 Further, a pharmacist may have a
duty to warn a customer or contact the physician if the pharmacist knows a
drug is contraindicated for the customer, as when a pharmacist knows a
customer is an alcoholic,177 has an allergy,178 or is taking another,
incompatible drug.179 In addition, if a pharmacist undertakes to collect
data on a client’s allergies,180 to monitor its client’s prescriptions for drug
interactions,181 or, perhaps, to warn of side-effects,182 it normally will be
bound to perform that undertaking with reasonable care.183 In these and
other situations where a pharmacist has special knowledge of a risk to a
particular client, courts have sometimes broken through the traditional
immunity and held pharmacists to a duty of reasonable care to warn of the
risk of addiction,184 potential drug interactions,185 and other adverse effects
175
See Downing v. Hyland Pharmacy, 194 P.3d 944, 949 (Utah 2008) (holding that the learned
intermediary doctrine does not exempt a pharmacy from liability for filling a prescription for drugs
withdrawn from the market by the FDA).
176
See Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that a jury could
conclude that the pharmacist failed to fulfill his duty by not informing the prescribing physician that he
was prescribing the medication at a significantly higher dose than recommended); Riff v. Morgan
Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1249–50, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that the pharmacy failed to
fulfill its duty by not supplementing inadequate instructions on a prescription).
177
See Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122–23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
178
See Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1124 (Ill. 2002) (ruling that a
pharmacy, because it undertook to compile plaintiff’s allergies, had superior knowledge and a duty to
exercise reasonable care to warn of foreseeable risk of allergic reaction).
179
See Brienze v. Casserly, No. 01-1655-C, 2003 WL 23018810, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 19,
2003); cf. Powers v. Thobhani, 903 So. 2d 275, 277, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing summary
judgment for a pharmacy in a case where the patient died from an overdose of OxyCodone and many
other prescription narcotics for neck and back pain that the pharmacy repeatedly filled too closely in
time).
180
See Happel, 766 N.E.2d at 1121, 1124.
181
See Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 729, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(“[D]efendant voluntarily assumed a duty of care when it implemented the Arbortech Plus system and
then advertised that this system would detect harmful drug interactions for its customers.”).
182
See In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1355, 2002 WL 1446714, at *4 (E.D. La.
July 2, 2002) (denying summary judgment when a pharmacy allegedly misrepresented the side-effects
to a customer); Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 818–19, 823 (Mass. 2002) (holding that by
providing a partial list of side-effects, reasonable care might require including impotency). Contra
Kasin v. Osco Drug, Inc., 728 N.E.2d 77, 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that by listing some sideeffects, pharmacy did not have duty to list them all).
183
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 43
(2010) (explaining liability for harm from negligent undertakings that increase risk or on which
plaintiff relies).
184
See Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 520–21 (Ind. 1994).
185
See Baker, 544 N.W.2d at 732–33 (finding that a pharmacist assumed a duty to warn by
advertising that its computerized drug detection system identified and prevented drug interactions);
Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 382, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (determining that a disputed issue
of fact exists whether pharmacy had a duty to warn of potential drug interactions).
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of prescription drugs.
How far these small cracks in the pharmacist’s no-duty-to-warn wall
eventually may propagate is impossible to say, and there clearly is no
stampede to break down the pharmacist’s virtual immunity from a warning
obligation.187 Yet, the pharmacy profession is changing in ways that
suggest that these strategically positioned experts in prescription
pharmaceuticals might properly be required to bear a greater responsibility
for warning patients of the hazards of such medications.
V. REFORMING PRIVATE DRUG LAW TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC HEALTH
Responsibility in private law for drug dangers has evolved reasonably
over time, but it needs to be reformed. The major problem generating a
need for reform is that the law on medical malpractice, federal preemption,
and a variety of products liability law principles developed separately,
under discrete doctrinal umbrellas, rather than together within a holistic
public health perspective. That is, private law duties on drug designs and
warnings have evolved with an insular tort law focus on how litigation has
been thought to promote drug safety and on whom most fairly, in terms of
fault, responsibility for drug injuries should be placed. Such conventional
tort law perspectives surely are fundamentally sound, yet they are
grounded in archaic visions of the evolving roles and relationships of the
affected groups—drug manufacturers, doctors, pharmacists, and patients.
Largely overlooked by the tort law litigation system—whose general
principles of reparative justice evolve narrowly, slowly, and incrementally
under the common law—are vital goals of the nation’s public health
system: consumer choice, quality health care, and cost containment.188
This section explores how private law might consider reforming three
principles of products liability law with respect to dangerous prescription
drugs: (1) the liability of prescription drug manufacturers for design
defects; (2) the limited duty of prescription drug manufacturers to provide
warnings only to healthcare providers, not directly to consumers; and (3)
the absence of a duty of pharmacists to provide warnings to consumers. In
examining the evolution of these principles of drug products liability law,
this Article has revealed their respective weaknesses. For reasons explored
186
See Guillory v. Dr. X, 679 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a pharmacist
has a duty to fill a prescription correctly and to warn the patient or to notify the prescribing physician of
an excessive dosage or of obvious inadequacies on the face of the prescription); see also Pittman v.
Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 435 (Tenn. 1994) (finding that the duty to warn did not extend to
patient’s third-party relative).
187
See Deed v. Walgreen Co., 927 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that, under
the learned intermediary doctrine, a pharmacist has no duty to warn customers); Morgan v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. App. 2000) (providing a thorough review of a pharmacist’s duty
to warn and concluding that the general, no-duty rule should be retained).
188
Broad, even universal, insurance coverage is another important healthcare goal, but it is largely
unrelated to private law.
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above, it is here proposed that prescription drug manufacturers be
exempted from private law responsibility for design defects, and that
manufacturers and pharmacists both be required to exercise reasonable care
in warning and instructing consumers on prescription drug dangers and
how to avoid them. This section sketches out how each of these reforms
appears consistent with three principal goals of healthcare reform:
maximizing consumer choice, improving healthcare quality, and
containing costs. The preliminary analysis here is intended as a start to
deeper inquiry into these and other private law reforms that may help
resolve the healthcare crisis.
A. Choice
Choice, a vital ingredient of human freedom, allows persons to
exercise autonomy in making important decisions about their lives.189 The
design of a healthcare system in a free society thus should promote
consumer choice as much as practicable. With respect to prescription
drugs, this means making useful information meaningfully available to
patients (as well as to their professional healthcare advisers) so that
patients can make genuinely informed decisions, guided by their doctors,
on which drugs (if any) to take to treat their particular conditions.190
Focusing on this objective reveals a number of shortcomings in current
principles of private drug law addressed by these three reforms.
1. Ban Liability for Defective Design
The first reform proposal is to ban claims against drug manufacturers
for defective design, a type of claim that a number of courts have allowed
over the last couple of decades.191 Courts that have allowed such claims,
drawing from conventional tort law rationales, often reason that drug
manufacturers should be subject to design defect claims to enhance the
safety of drugs and provide compensatory relief to persons injured by
drugs designed in an unnecessarily dangerous manner.192 Yet, narrowly
189
See David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201, 209 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“Autonomy entails the notion that a
person may—indeed, must—make choices and then act upon those choices.”); Owen, Figuring
Foreseeability, supra note 79 (explaining the relationship between autonomy and choice).
190
See Oonagh Corrigan, Empty Ethics: The Problem with Informed Consent, 25 SOC. HEALTH &
ILLNESS 768, 769–70 (2003) (noting that the underpinning of informed consent is that it will protect the
autonomy of patients in making free and informed choices); Jessica J. Flinn, Comment, Personalizing
Informed Consent: The Challenge of Health Literacy, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379–94
(2009) (recognizing the low “health literacy” of millions of Americans and adoption of the “reasonable
patient” standard as the scope of a physician’s duty to inform in order to combat it).
191
See supra note 48 and accompanying text (listing the courts that have accepted the FeldmanKearl case-by-case approach to allowing prescription drug design defect liability claims).
192
See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 833–42 (Neb. 2000) (adopting a
case-by-case application of comment k as an affirmative defense to a plaintiff’s design defect claim for
prescription drugs).
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focusing on traditional tort law goals—deterrence and compensation—
misses altogether broader aspects of drug safety in the healthcare system.
A normal design defect challenge to a drug’s design suggests that a drug
(like any other type of product) could and should have been designed more
safely some other way.193 Apart from the important fact that most dangers
in a drug are unavoidable attributes of the very chemicals that promote its
cures,194 design defect claims discourage manufacturers from developing
and marketing new drugs that would provide new approaches to conditions
for which another drug already may exist. This disincentive exists because
conventional cost-benefit theory for design defectiveness suggests that
only one design can optimally achieve a health or other benefit when
balanced against competing safety and other costs.195
A look back at the earlier illustration involving three drugs for lung
infections, each with differing side-effects,196 illuminates this problem. It
will be recalled that although each of these separate drugs for the same
condition caused side-effects in some people, each provided effective
treatment for others, so that each such drug was reasonably “designed.”
Yet, if drug design defect litigation were generally allowed, once the first
such drug was marketed, other drug manufacturers would have little
incentive to spend the half billion dollars or so required to develop and
market a new lung infection drug.197 Consumer (and physician) choice
would be materially enhanced if the other two drugs became available, but
manufacturers would be gambling large to develop them at all, for it often
is difficult to predict which among two or more drugs aimed at the same
malady lay jurors ultimately may conclude has the best ratio of benefits to
risks.
Thus, a robust design-defect litigation process would tend to drive all
drugs competing for the treatment of each particular ailment, but one, from
the market, notwithstanding the fact that a variety of drugs—each with
slightly differing side-effects and benefits for different people—may enrich
the pharmacopeia available to a population comprised of many millions of
very different people. As for protecting the public from improperly
designed drugs, the combination of vigorous FDA oversight, warning
claims against manufacturers, and market incentives (consider the costs to

193

See Conk, True Test, supra note 14, at 738–39 (criticizing the exclusion of prescription drugs
from the “general measure of product design defect—the reasonable alternative design test”); Conk,
Design Defect, supra note 14, at 1089 (stating that the Restatement (Third) of Torts’s exemption of
medical devices from the alternative-safer-design standard “reverses thirty-five years of safetyadvancing products-liability law”).
194
See supra Part III.A.
195
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 8.5.
196
See supra Part III.B.
197
See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of bringing a new prescription
drug to the market).
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198

Merck of the Vioxx recall and imbroglio) seems preferable to scattered
juries empanelled in boxes of twelve for resolving the baskets of complex
policy questions involved in determining what kinds of drugs (with what
kinds of benefits, risks, and warnings) properly should be on the market.
The issue here is about choice; the lung infection illustration above shows
how drug availability and, thus, choice are restricted by private litigation
into the defectiveness of drug designs. Banning drug design litigation
altogether would remove this obstacle and thereby promote consumer
choice.
2. Expand Duties to Warn
If drug manufacturers are protected from design defect litigation,
which they should be, then they should also be required to disseminate
information widely and effectively about whatever dangers their drugs may
contain. Warnings of this type, of course, are vital to intelligent choice
about the desirability of particular drugs. Current principles on warning
“adequacy” are suited to the substantive aspect of this task.199 But, as
previously discussed, two limited-duty principles seriously obstruct the
dissemination of warning information: liability shields protecting both drug
manufacturers and pharmacists from providing warnings directly to
patients.200 Both types of healthcare providers are protected by the learned
intermediary principle and its premise that only doctors (and nurse
practitioners) should communicate directly with patients about the costs
and benefits of particular drugs. Yet, manufacturers and pharmacists—not
doctors—are the true experts on pharmaceuticals.201 Making useful
information about prescription drugs available to patients, the ultimate
consumers, is necessary to maximizing choice, since uninformed choice is
no choice at all.202
198

See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
This assumption is premised on the continued decline of the federal preemption doctrine as a
bar to warning adequacy claims against drug manufacturers. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187,
1191 (2009) (holding that prior FDA approval of a drug label did not bar an inadequate warning claim);
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 20,
2009) (restraining agencies from secreting preemption rulings in preambles to federal regulations and
from asserting the preemptive effect of federal law without sufficient justification); see also Mary J.
Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089,
1089–94 (2007).
200
See supra Parts IV.D–E.
201
See The Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of American Report, in THE PURSUIT OF
HIGH PERFORMANCE THROUGH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COST DRIVERS 4–11 (2007), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/
Accenture%20R&D%20Report-2007.pdf (noting the vast amounts of time and money spent by
pharmaceutical companies on research and development); supra note 162 and accompanying text
(noting the extensive training pharmacists receive in all aspects of drug therapy compared to the
cursory training doctors receive).
202
Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, supra note 79, at 1281–82.
199
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To enhance choice, therefore, private law should abolish the learned
intermediary rule. So doing would provide both manufacturers and
pharmacists with duties to communicate useful cost-benefit information
about drug dangers—effective, not vague boilerplate warnings—to
consumers. Doctors (often, together with their health-education delegates)
would retain their vital, professional duty to link appropriate drugs to
appropriate patients, but drug manufacturers no longer would be allowed to
entice consumers with television commercials—depicting happy and
healthy people dancing in fields of flowers—only to shield themselves
from a responsibility to warn behind the doctor’s white coat. And
pharmacists would also be required to share their very substantial
pharmacological expertise with the people they directly serve—a
responsibility that this noble profession, marginalized so long by the
learned intermediary doctrine, might enthusiastically embrace. Ultimately,
abolishing the learned intermediary rule should increase the amount of
information on drug dangers provided to consumers, improving their
opportunity for an intelligent, final say on what types of dangerous
pharmaceuticals, if any, they choose to consume.203
B. Quality
In a truly liberal democracy, quality health care means the
individualized health care chosen by each citizen, so that the very idea of
quality, at a fundamental level, merges into choice. But there are also
objective aspects to quality health care relevant to the private law
prescription drug issues examined here. First, banning drug design
litigation should increase the availability of drugs, as discussed above,
thereby providing doctors (with patient input) with greater opportunities to
make better matches of particular drugs to particular patients.204 Drug
therapy, therefore, should be improved by this change in private law.
The proposal to broaden duties to warn should also improve the quality
of health care.205 As manufacturers and pharmacists fulfill their new duties
to provide consumers with effective information about various drug
choices, informed consumers will be better positioned to help doctors
decide, initially, which (if any) drugs are best suited to their particular
conditions and constitutions. Moreover, once patients begin to take
particular drugs, they will be better informed (by manufacturers, doctors,
203
Another important reform to private drug law, albeit outside the scope of this Article, is to lift
some preemption restrictions to products liability actions imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the
last couple of decades. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001)
(prohibiting state law actions for fraud-on-the-FDA). President Obama recently reversed the Bush
administration’s similarly restrictive preemption policies. See Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 199.
204
See supra Part V.A.1.
205
See supra Part V.A.2.
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and pharmacists) on what warning signals to watch out for with respect to
particular side-effects, allowing them to seek ameliorative care sooner than
otherwise would be the case. Harm caused by drug side-effects should
therefore be reduced.
C. Cost
While choice and quality of health care are both quite likely to
improve from the proposed reforms, it is more difficult to predict the net
effects of such reforms on costs and cost containment in the healthcare
system. Surely some costs will increase. First, if design litigation is
banned, manufacturers should make larger investments in developing,
manufacturing, and marketing new drugs, as previously postulated.206 Yet,
one might reasonably assume that manufacturers will assure that the
benefits of drugs in which they invest will exceed their costs. Indeed,
without the constant threat of unpredictable drug design litigation, the
accuracy of a manufacturer’s cost-benefit analyses of its drugs should be
improved.
In addition, increasing the warning responsibilities of
manufacturers and pharmacists, and indirectly of doctors (who will have to
spend more time answering questions posed by better-informed patients),
will generate various direct information costs, and a surfeit of available
information may result in “warnings pollution,” which has costs of its
own.207
Despite these cost increases, the reforms proposed here should
decrease various other costs of the healthcare system. First, improvements
in the quality of health care discussed above should enhance the health of
the citizenry and thus lower the costs of health care overall.208 For
example, improving drug therapy by expanding the duties to warn should
alleviate some conditions that otherwise would require more expensive
surgical intervention. Moreover, fully informed patients should be less
likely to agree to unnecessary drug treatments that some doctors may
prescribe defensively to guard against malpractice litigation, since patients
should not want to expose themselves to disclosed drug dangers unless
they have reason to believe that the benefits of the proposed drug therapy
outweigh the risks.
Other cost decreases may result from structural changes in how health
information is delivered, changes that may be prompted by the proposals
offered here. Presently, doctors and nurse practitioners are the only parties
charged with providing information to patients, as previously discussed.209
206
Cf. supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (explaining how design defect litigation
discourages manufacturers from developing new drugs).
207
See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3.
208
See supra Part V.
209
See supra Part IV.D.
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Yet widening the duty to disseminate health information to manufacturers
and pharmacists is likely to create a veritable revolution in how
information is disseminated, as previously suggested.210 For example,
patient counseling on drug dangers by expert pharmacists is plainly
cheaper than by physicians, whose time is typically more expensive and
often better spent on the direct provision of health care. Another result of
this information revolution may be to help doctors realize that they need to
partner with professional health educators in healthcare delivery. Today,
doctors as a practical matter fail to fulfill their informed consent
responsibilities to inform patients fully and meaningfully on the costs and
benefits of a proposed drug or other treatment, including alternative
treatments, or no treatment at all.211 Once healthcare consumers become
routinely bombarded with information on the benefits and risks of various
drug therapies by manufacturers and pharmacists (as well as by doctors),
doctors may become overwhelmed with patient questions about the
benefits and risks of drugs and alternative therapies. In such an
environment, it seems likely that many doctors will choose to delegate
considerable responsibility for information dissemination to professional
health educators, whose time is less expensive than that of physicians. In
this way, increased burdens from broader health information disclosure
duties may prompt helpful structural changes in healthcare delivery that
decrease the costs (and improve the quality) of information dissemination.
The doctrine of comparative fault may appropriately generate another
cost saving. Once consumers become broadly informed of drug dangers
under the reforms suggested here, they should be fully equipped to make
intelligent decisions on their own drug therapies. If, with all this
information, they fail to participate meaningfully in initial drug therapy
decisions, or if they later fail adequately to monitor their conditions during
therapy, responsibility for a harmful result that a cautious patient would
have avoided should logically fall on the shoulders of the passively
imprudent patient.212 The careless patient in this scenario would
appropriately be deprived of some or all legal relief against the drug
manufacturer, the doctor, or the pharmacist, which would effectively
remove these costs from the healthcare system.

210

See id.
See Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
313, 313–17 (2002) (describing current practices relating to informed consent as “a charade, a symbolic
but contentless formality”); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900–06
(1994) (examining the ineffectiveness of informed consent to health care and recommending its
contextualized application).
212
Although the patient’s worsened condition may generate additional healthcare needs,
presumably this outcome would have been the same under the current private law regime.
211
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VI. CONCLUSION
Structural proposals for reforming the healthcare system presently at
large appear to overlook important ways in which private law affects the
system. Current law on responsibility for dangers from prescription drugs
is antiquated by its narrow obsession with classic tort law goals to the
exclusion of the broader needs of the healthcare system. It is here
proposed to reform current law by banning design defect litigation against
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, and by abolishing the learned
intermediary doctrine, the latter of which would impose full-bodied duties
to warn consumers on both manufacturers and pharmacists. Consistent
with traditional principles of private drug law, these reforms appear to
promote central goals of healthcare reform—maximizing consumer choice,
increasing quality, and reducing costs of health care in America. Each of
these reform proposals is bold, yet the current healthcare crisis in this
nation demands bold solutions. Private law should be flexible enough,
perhaps with some legislative help, to shift its focus to provide appropriate
incentives to drug companies, pharmacists, and patients to partner together
to minimize harm from and maximize the benefits of the vast
pharmacopeia of drugs.

